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Future 2040 › The 14 pillars
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Financing · Pillar 01

When wages fall, the state collapses.

The tax system is the invisible architecture of every economic model. In the economy ahead, it becomes the sharpest point of rupture and the greatest point of leverage.

Pillar 01KI
01 · Status quo & fault line

Where do things stand today, and where do they break?

Status quo

Western welfare states are financed primarily from labour-linked sources. In Switzerland around 70% of AHV revenues come from wage contributions (2025: 71%), in Germany about 40% of government revenue comes from wages and social security contributions; across the OECD, labour-related taxes account for around 50% of the total. At the same time, a growing share of value creation flows to capital income and technology rents, which have historically been taxed at lower rates than labour. The gap between where value is created and where tax is collected has been widening for three decades. AI is accelerating this shift sharply.

Fault line

If AI automates 20–40% of tasks in the knowledge economy (Goldman Sachs 2023, McKinsey 2024), a third of the tax base disappears before political consensus for alternatives is in place. The result: collapsing welfare systems, a shrinking middle class, social polarisation, all at once. Anyone who does not solve the funding question has no model.

02 · Policy options

Paths out of the crisis

The stars show how realistic a path is: 1 star = barely feasible, 5 stars = highly feasible.

A★★☆☆☆ 2/5

Robot tax (Pigouvian principle: tax what causes harm)

A tax per robot, AI agent or automated task (Bill Gates 2017, South Korea since 2018).

+ Intuitively fair.

Definition problem; innovation migrates elsewhere.

Trade-off: Attractiveness as a business location declines.

Feasibility: Widely debated politically, but not implemented on any meaningful scale. The definition problem continues to block concrete legislation. South Korea remains the only country to have introduced a scaled-back version of the mechanism.

B★★★★☆ 4/5

Higher Capital Gains Taxation

Value creation increasingly comes from capital. Taxation follows it there.

+ Targets the winners.

Capital is more mobile than labour. Global coordination is required.

Trade-off: Investment appetite declines under maximisation.

Feasibility: The OECD minimum tax is already in effect and is being extended in scope. A gradual increase represents the most likely path — technically and politically — over the next ten years.

C★★☆☆☆ 2/5

Land Value Tax (Henry George)

Tax land value rather than development. AI clusters raise land values, and land does not move.

+ The most efficient tax model in theory. Singapore funds ~30% of its government budget through land-related levies.

Politically fraught (property-owner lobby), valuation problems.

Trade-off: Politically costly, economically favourable.

Feasibility: Economically the most robust model, yet politically blocked almost everywhere by property-owner lobbies. Realistic in city-states; in federal democracies, viable only as local pilot schemes.

D★★★☆☆ 3/5

Data / AI Dividend

Citizens as co-owners of AI infrastructure via a sovereign fund (applying the Alaska/Norway logic to AI).

+ Addresses ownership at its root.

Rarely achievable politically without a boom moment.

Trade-off: Only works if the state enters early.

Feasibility: Methodologically clear, politically sensitive: hyperscalers will fight equity claims. More likely in countries with a sovereign-wealth tradition (Norway, Singapore, Switzerland with an AHV link).

E★★★★☆ 4/5

CO₂ as a key pillar

Externalities replace labour taxes. Sweden charges about €120 per tonne, and its economy has grown regardless.

+ Double dividend: climate & distribution.

Insufficient as a standalone solution.

Trade-off: A pillar, not a complete substitute.

Feasibility: EU-ETS (the European carbon emissions trading scheme) and national carbon taxes are already a reality. Scaling to €200+ per tonne sits within the range of what is politically possible. The driver is climate targets, not tax policy as such.

03 · Time horizon

Trigger-based phases

Phase 1
Catalyst

Trigger: First OECD-wide majority in favour of an explicit data levy or strategic-stake mechanism on AI corporations

The political agenda shifts. First pilot legislation in Scandinavia and the EU. Lobbying activity realigns. EU ETS prices begin climbing towards €150/t. Visible in finance-ministry statements, OECD working papers and European Commission proposals.

Phase 2
Structural reform

Trigger: First G7 country establishes a sovereign AI fund with strategic stakes

Concrete implementation of the three pillars. The share of labour taxation declines measurably. Asset managers begin repositioning. Switzerland advances an AHV 2.0 reform; data levies become standard in two to three EU countries. Carbon prices reach the €200/t corridor.

Phase 3
Consolidation

Trigger: The welfare state is funded more than 50% from capital, data and externalities, no longer from labour tax

The new system is the status quo. The old wage-tax architecture is a historical artefact. Tax competition is shifting from location-based taxes to levies on capital and data. Sovereign wealth funds hold substantial stakes in AI champions.

04 · Pilot Programmes

Real-world pilot programmes

Where the ideas behind this pillar are already being tested. "Learn more" opens the explanation without leaving the page.

Norway · Statens Pensjonsfond Utland ↗Status: active, established 1990, first contribution 1996 · value 30.6.2026: NOK 22,683bn, on average 1.5% of all listed companies worldwideThe global benchmark for sovereign wealth funds. Democratically controlled, fiscally transparent, and ethically constrained. The fund converts oil and gas revenues into public capital wealth across generations; the fiscal rule channels only a share of the expected return into the budget. The platform sees it as a model for a Swiss AHV 2.0 mechanism.
Sweden · Carbon Tax ↗Status: active since 1991 · 2026 rate: SEK 1,520 (EUR 138) per tonne of fossil CO2A real-world case showing that a high and steadily rising carbon price can remain politically viable over decades. The rate rose from SEK 250 per tonne in 1991 to SEK 1,520 in 2026. Emissions fell while GDP grew; how much of that is attributable to the tax remains contested in the research. A strong counter-example to the competitiveness-argument reflex, but not proof.
OECD · Pillar Two: Global Minimum Tax ↗Status: active since 2024, 15% minimum rate · 147 members of the Inclusive Framework agreed to the Side-by-Side package (January 2026), only a portion has implemented itThe first global tax agreement to coordinate capital taxation systemically: an effective minimum tax of 15% for corporations with revenues above €750m, implemented through national legislation. The Side-by-Side package of January 2026 reveals the limits, however: US corporations are exempt from IIR and UTPR from financial year 2026.
Singapore · Property tax ↗Status: active · FY2025/26: SGD 6.9bn, 7.1% of tax revenueAn annual tax on the estimated rental value of land and buildings, not a pure Land Value Tax; owner-occupied homes are taxed at a lower, progressive rate. It is a stable, hard-to-shift revenue source, though a secondary pillar in the budget. Singapore's large land revenues come from state land sales and leases. Limitation: this is a city-state in which the government owns most of the land, so the model does not transfer directly to federal democracies.
Alaska · Permanent Fund Dividend ↗Status: active since 1982 · amount set annually by policy, 2026: USD 1,200 per person (including USD 200 energy supplement)The world's oldest Capital Dividend, funded from returns of the oil-backed Alaska Permanent Fund. Politically stable for over 40 years, though the amount varies considerably with budget decisions and the oil price. The platform sees it as a template for AI Capital Dividend models.
South Korea · De facto robot tax ↗Status: 2017 tax reform: investment tax credit for automation at large companies reduced from 3% to 1% · current applicability not confirmedIn 2017, South Korea cut tax incentives for automation investment rather than introducing a dedicated robot tax: large companies from 3% to 1%, mid-sized from 5% to 3%, small firms retained 7%. The effect is barely measurable. The lesson: politically easier than a direct robot tax, and the debate over an AI and robot tax has revived in 2025.
05 · Early Indicators

What we are watching

OECD minimum tax rate
Today
15%
Threshold
18%

First genuine political momentum towards a capital-tax architecture. Phase-1 trigger.

EU ETS carbon price
Today
~€85/t (Source: ICE Futures Europe)
Threshold
EUR 120/t

Carbon becomes fiscally material. Markets are pricing in its emergence as a primary fiscal pillar.

Number of OECD countries with an explicit data levy
Today
0
Threshold
1

Taboo broken. Other countries typically follow within 24 months.

Track in the index →
Sovereign Wealth Fund · AI Asset Allocation Global
Today
~3% (GI estimate)
Threshold
8%

SWFs are becoming structural buyers of AI champions. Market moves are likely to follow.

Swiss AHV: share of payroll contributions
Today
71% (2025)
Threshold
60%

Structural reform of the AHV is visibly under way. Phase-2 trigger for Switzerland.

06 · Globalance Position

Our assessment

At Globalance, we regard the tax shift as the most important fiscal policy movement of the next 15 years and as unavoidable. The mathematical logic of a shrinking wage-tax base can be delayed by political means, but it cannot be overridden. Any model that leaves the financing question unanswered is no model at all.

A sustainable architecture rests on three pillars: increased Capital gains taxation with global OECD coordination, substantial CO₂ and externality levies as a dual climate-and-fiscal dividend, and an explicit Data / AI Dividend via a sovereign wealth mechanism. The Land Value Tax is economically the strongest model, but politically it is achievable only in local pilots. We recommend it for city-states and smaller jurisdictions, not as a national solution.

We regard the robot tax as the wrong approach, though the question behind it is the right one. As value creation increasingly comes from automation, public financing must follow. The proposal fails on definition: where automation begins and what counts as a robot is almost impossible to determine in law. Implementation attempts so far show correspondingly little fiscal effect. Levies on capital income and on data achieve the same goal with more reliable tax bases.

From a Swiss perspective direct democracy is both an advantage and a risk. The advantage: a broadly supported reform, such as an "AHV 2.0" with a capital-stock component, can be adopted here more quickly than in EU consensus democracies. The risk: an initiative against higher capital taxes, argued on the grounds of Switzerland's appeal as a business location, can delay the transition by years. That argument is not without foundation. Switzerland lives from its appeal to mobile capital. It stands against a second, equally real consideration: a welfare state without funding is no competitive advantage for a business location either. What matters is whether Switzerland approaches this reform with foresight or only acts under the pressure of crisis.

What this means for investors: First, capital returns and corporate profits are likely to be taxed more heavily than today. Return expectations should reflect that, not ignore it. Second, levies on CO2 and other external costs could rise. Business models that depend on low emission prices carry a valuation risk; efficient providers gain. Third, retirement provision remains the biggest outstanding challenge. A larger capital base in the AHV would increase demand for long-term assets. Fourth, it is worth examining a company's effective tax rate: those paying conspicuously little today have the most to lose when the rules tighten.

Why now: The real problem is not the instrument, but the speed of the transition. If the tax base shrinks faster than the new architecture takes effect, a fiscal vacuum lasting 5–10 years emerges. That is the phase in which democracies tip. History shows this in the Weimar Republic, in post-Soviet transition economies, and in Latin American debt crises. Three years of proactive design are a hundred times more effective than three years of crisis repair.

The case against

The strongest objection concerns the time arrow. Capital is mobile; labour is not. Higher capital taxation works only when the major jurisdictions move together, and the OECD minimum tax took around fifteen years to agree on a single rate. A country that begins the transition nationally shifts substance rather than capturing it; one that waits for international alignment may arrive too late. It is a real scenario that both paths prove too slow and the welfare state is instead financed through debt: not as a decision, but as a way of avoiding one.

07 · Open Questions

What we do not yet know

  1. How can tax competition between jurisdictions be prevented without stifling innovation?
  2. Which policy mix can be made to stick politically in a direct-democratic system such as Switzerland?
  3. How does tax law treat synthetic data and foundation models trained on publicly available text?
  4. Who is best placed to act as custodian of a sovereign AI fund: the state, a cooperative, or a foundation?
  5. How rapidly can the transition proceed without the fiscal vacuum threatening political stability?

Connected to: 02 · Income, 03 · Value Creation, 07 · Data & AI, 09 · Ecology

Scenarios: Economics & Capital · Geopolitics & Governance · Investment Implications

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