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Planet · Pillar 09

Decoupling growth from resources, or climate game over.

The economy ahead creates the historic opportunity to structurally decouple growth from resource consumption. AI itself, however, is energy-intensive. The question will be decided by three levers: carbon pricing, compute efficiency, and the energy mix for data centres. The next ten years are the last window for an orderly transition.

Pillar 09KI
01 · Status quo & fault line

Where do things stand today, and where do they break?

Status quo

Global CO2 emissions stand at ~38 Gt CO2 per year in 2026. The Paris 1.5° budget is effectively exhausted; the 2° budget shrinks by ~40 Gt each year. EU carbon prices (EU-ETS) are ~€95/t in 2026, structurally too low. Switzerland levies a CO2 tax on fuels of ~CHF 120/t, but not broadly on transport and industrial processes. AI datacentres are massively energy-intensive: in 2026 they consume ~2% of global electricity, with forecasts of 7–10% by 2030. The datacenter boom in Texas, Arizona and Virginia carries no efficiency requirements. China dominates green industrial sectors (solar: 80% of world production; batteries: 70%; e-mobility: 50%) while also generating the largest absolute emissions. Carbon-removal technology (Climeworks, Heirloom) is at pilot stage, technically functional but not yet cost-scalable (~$600/t).

Fault line

Three mutually reinforcing crises: Climate (Paris budget exhausted, adaptation costs spiralling), AI Energy (surging compute demand meets energy constraints, datacentre expansion proceeds in a disorderly fashion), Strategic Minerals (Lithium, Rare Earth, copper as a geopolitical asset, China dominant). When transformation not When AI is linked to climate policy, both crises amplify each other: AI makes economies more productive while raising resource consumption. If the link succeeds, the economy ahead is the historic opportunity to decouple growth from resources that we have sought since industrialisation.

02 · Policy options

Paths out of the crisis

The stars show how realistic a path is: 1 star = barely feasible, 5 stars = highly feasible.

A★★★★★ 5/5

CO₂ price of €220+ per tonne, including CBAM (the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism)

A substantial increase in carbon pricing across the EU and Switzerland to approximately 220 EUR/t by 2032, alongside a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism for imports.

+ Market-compatible, sends a strong signal, and amenable to EU-level coordination.

Substantive political resistance.

Trade-off: Climate impact vs. industrial competitiveness.

Feasibility: The EU ETS reform pathway remains contested. Switzerland operates its own system; the EU CBAM has been in force since 2026. At €220/t, industry is compelled to restructure and carbon removal becomes commercially viable. Politically contentious, but necessary.

B★★★★☆ 4/5

Compute efficiency standards (PUE requirements)

Binding efficiency standards for datacentres: Power Usage Effectiveness (PUE) below 1.2 as a minimum, a renewables quota, and water recycling.

+ Direct lever on AI energy demand.

Competition for compute locations.

Trade-off: Efficiency vs. locational attractiveness.

Feasibility: The EU is planning a datacenter efficiency regulation. Google already achieves PUE 1.10, the best in class, while AWS and Azure run at ~1.20–1.30. Swiss datacentres using hydropower and geothermal cooling hold a structural advantage. That advantage is a location proposition for a European champion.

C★★★★☆ 4/5

Carbon Removal as industrial policy

Substantial support for Direct Air Capture, bioenergy with CCS and mineralisation as strategic industrial sectors.

+ Addresses residual emissions, creates an industrial sector.

Not yet economically scalable.

Trade-off: Investment today vs. impact in 10–15 years.

Feasibility: Climeworks (CH) is the global market leader, alongside Heirloom (US) and Charm Industrial. The EU carbon-removal market is growing at an explosive pace (€50–100bn per year by 2030). Swiss levers include scaling Climeworks, ETH research, and private capital entering early.

D★★★☆☆ 3/5

Nuclear renaissance for compute electricity supply

A new generation of Small Modular Reactors (NuScale, BWX) as low-carbon power for data centres.

+ Structurally low-carbon and baseload-capable.

Social acceptance risks, long construction lead times.

Trade-off: Climate efficiency vs. political acceptance.

Feasibility: NuScale (US, first approval 2023), BWX and Westinghouse. China is expanding aggressively (~150 reactors planned by 2050). Switzerland has no pathway following its 2017 nuclear exit; the EU path is divided, with France in favour and Germany against. Strategically important, culturally sensitive.

E★★★☆☆ 3/5

Strategic Mineral Sovereignty

EU and Swiss self-sufficiency in lithium, rare earths and copper: through recycling, domestic extraction and sovereign investments.

+ Reduces dependence on China and enables the energy transition.

Technically and ecologically substantive.

Trade-off: Strategic autonomy vs. the environmental cost of extraction.

Feasibility: EU Critical Raw Materials Act 2024, US IRA with localisation requirements. Swiss levers: recycling technology (Veolia, BHS Sonthofen), investment in EU critical raw materials extraction. Geopolitically significant, ecologically ambivalent — extraction destroys ecosystems.

03 · Time horizon

Trigger-based phases

Phase 1
Carbon price acceleration

Trigger: EU ETS reform with a pathway to €150/t by 2030.

2026–2029. EU carbon price trajectory accelerated. Swiss CO₂ levy extended to transport and industry. CBAM deepened. Datacentre efficiency regulation under discussion in the EU and Switzerland. Climeworks achieves first industrial-scale deployment.

Phase 2
Compute standards & the carbon removal industry

Trigger: EU Data Centre Efficiency Regulation enters into force.

2029–2034. PUE below 1.2 becomes the minimum. Swiss datacentres command a premium. The carbon removal market reaches €10–20bn a year. Climeworks and Heirloom scale to remove 100,000–500,000 tonnes of CO₂ per year. EU battery localisation takes effect.

Phase 3
Decarbonisation Wave

Trigger: Carbon price at 220+ EUR/t in EU/CH.

2034–2038. Industry structurally decarbonised. Carbon removal becomes self-sustaining. EU battery, solar, and recycling sectors establish themselves as industrial champions. Swiss per-capita emissions fall below 2.5 t. Strategic mineral recycling quotas reach 60%+.

Phase 4
Decoupling growth from resources

Trigger: The EU economy grows in absolute terms while resource consumption falls in absolute terms.

2038 onwards. Structural decoupling achieved: the historic opportunity open to an industrial society. Swiss per-capita emissions below 1.8 t CO₂. Carbon removal offsets remaining emissions. The AI wave has not undermined the climate balance but structurally improved it.

04 · Pilot Programmes

Real-world pilot programmes

Where the ideas behind this pillar are already being tested. "Learn more" opens the explanation without leaving the page.

Climeworks: Direct Air Capture (Switzerland) ↗Status: active since 2009, Mammoth (Iceland) since 2024 · designed for 36,000 t/year, H1 2026: 675 t capturedA Zurich-based pioneer in direct air capture: it removes CO₂ from the air using filter systems and has it mineralised underground in Iceland. The Mammoth plant has run on geothermal energy since 2024, but operates well below its designed capacity. It shows the technology works, though it remains small relative to the need. A reference point for a Swiss role in carbon removal.
EU CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism) ↗Status: transitional phase since October 2023, definitive phase since 1 January 2026 · full application from 2035An EU mechanism that places a carbon price on imports of cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity, and hydrogen, aligned with EU emissions trading, to prevent carbon leakage. Its introduction was softened and stretched: a threshold of 50 t per year exempts about 90% of importers, and certificates go on sale from February 2027. It serves as a model for extending carbon pricing to imports. Switzerland is exempt because its emissions trading system is linked to the EU's, and has so far not introduced its own equivalent mechanism.
Google PUE 1.09: data centre fleet efficiency ↗Status: active, PUE published since 2008 · fleet Q2 2026: 1.09 (12 months), global average 2025: 1.54Google reports a PUE of 1.09 for its data centre fleet, against a global average of 1.54 (Uptime Institute). The figures are self-reported. They demonstrate that very low overhead consumption is achievable at scale; they say nothing about the rapidly growing total electricity use.
05 · Early Indicators

What we are watching

EU Carbon Price (EU ETS)
Today
~€95/t (2026, source: ICE/EEX)
Threshold
€220+/t by 2034

Structural carbon pricing. A threshold of 220+ EUR/t makes carbon removal self-sustaining and compels industry to decarbonise.

Swiss per-capita CO₂ emissions
Today
~4.4t (2026, source: FOEN)
Threshold
1.8t by 2040

Structural decarbonisation. The 1.8t threshold aligns with the 1.5°C pathway; without carbon removal offsets, the threshold rises to 2.0t.

Share of PUE < 1.2 data centres in EU/CH
Today
~30% (2026, GI estimate)
Threshold
85% by 2032

Structural compute efficiency. The 85% threshold marks the standardisation of efficiency requirements.

Track in the index →
Global carbon removal market
Today
~$1bn (2026, source: BloombergNEF)
Threshold
$50bn by 2030

Carbon removal as an industry. The $50bn threshold marks commercial viability without subsidies.

06 · Globalance Position

Our assessment

At Globalance, we regard the combination of rising carbon taxes and compute efficiency standards as the single most important structural lever. of the economy ahead. A CO2 tax at 220+ EUR/t is methodologically the only mechanism that prices externalities correctly. Compute-efficiency standards prevent the AI wave from destroying the climate balance sheet. Together, both create the conditions for decoupling growth from resources.

The EU carbon tax trajectory must be substantially accelerated. The current EU-ETS level of ~€95/t is structurally too low. Standard industrial-policy logic holds that investment decisions shift at ~€150/t and carbon removal becomes commercially viable at ~€220/t. The path: a stepwise rise to €150/t by 2030 and €220+/t by 2034, with CBAM extended to all imports above €100/t.

Compute efficiency standards for data centres are long overdue. An EU datacenter efficiency regulation (PUE below 1.2, renewables quota above 80%, water recycling) would be the direct lever. Switzerland's position is strong through hydropower cooling at CSCS Lugano and the EPFL datacenter. The global AI compute boom can become a Swiss location advantage if the EU sets strict efficiency standards.

Carbon removal is strategic industrial policy. Climeworks, based in Switzerland, is already the global market leader in this field. That position must be built upon strategically. A federal investment programme of CHF 200–500m over ten years, combined with public procurement whereby the federal government purchases carbon-removal certificates as standard for its activities, would support that goal. The EU Innovation Fund provides a parallel instrument. At a CO₂ price of €220+/t, carbon removal becomes self-sustaining.

We do not consider a nuclear renaissance realistic for Switzerland: The 2017 nuclear exit decision is firmly anchored in Swiss society. The EU path is divided; France is driving Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) while Germany phases out. Swiss pragmatism argues against a nuclear renaissance, but supports research within ETH/EPFL and joint EU projects. The energy mix remains hydro, solar, wind, geothermal and imports.

Strategic Mineral Sovereignty is a double-edged sword. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act is a welcome step in the right direction, yet the environmental costs of extraction — lithium salts in Chile, rare earths in China, copper in the DRC and Peru — are real. Swiss leverage lies in recycling technology (the Veolia alliance, Swiss specialist firms), and investment in European extraction (lithium in Portugal and the Czech Republic) to high environmental standards.

What this means for investors: First, Europe has priced in a higher carbon price through the expansion of emissions trading and the carbon border adjustment. Heavy emitters lose margin; efficient producers gain pricing power. Second, data centres are becoming large consumers of electricity. Energy efficiency, cooling, waste-heat recovery and grid capacity are becoming bottlenecks for AI growth and therefore an investment theme. Third, carbon removal is still in its early stages. It is a field for long-term, risk-tolerant capital, not for stable returns. Fourth, recycling and the recovery of strategic raw materials gain in value as access to primary sources becomes scarcer and more politically contested.

Why now: The Paris 1.5° budget is effectively exhausted; the 2° budget shrinks by ~40 Gt each year. The next ten years will decide whether the world moves onto a 2.5° path or a 3.5° path. The AI wave makes the climate problem harder, not easier, unless actively countered. Any country that does not accelerate climate policy in the next five to seven years will have no orderly transition path in ten years' time.

The case against

The strongest objection concerns distributional effects. A levy of this size hits low-income households proportionally hardest, and the redistribution meant to offset that has nowhere been designed in a way that people feel it in daily life. Without that tangible effect, no majority will stay the course to €220. This is not conjecture; it has been observed in several countries. The second objection: efficiency standards reduce the cost per computing step, and historically that leads to more computing steps, not lower consumption.

07 · Open Questions

What we do not yet know

  1. How can rising EU carbon prices be balanced against industrial competitiveness vis-à-vis the United States and China?
  2. Should Switzerland follow France's SMR path or stick with the nuclear phase-out decided in 2017?
  3. How do we prevent Strategic Mineral Sovereignty from tipping into destructive extraction?
  4. Who bears the fiscal costs of climate adaptation: globally, across the EU, or nationally?

Connected to: 03 · Value Creation, 07 · Data & AI, 06 · Democracy

Scenarios: Economics & Capital · Geopolitics & Governance · Technology & AI

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