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PILLAR 07 · DIGITAL GOODS · CHINA

Data & AI as Commons

Status China: In preparationChina Module · Digital Goods

Comprehensive state data policy and data exchanges; the Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) has been in force since 2021, with the balance between state and individual interests still unresolved.

01 · STATUS QUO & FAULT LINE

Where does China stand, and where might it break?

STATUS QUO

China treats data differently from the West — not primarily as a privacy right, but as a factor of production and a national asset. With the Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL, 2021) and the Data Security Law (DSL, 2021), China established a comprehensive legal framework. In 2022, the leadership classified data as the fifth factor of production alongside labour, capital, land and technology under the Data 20 Measures, and established state-run data exchanges in Shanghai, Shenzhen and Beijing through which data is traded, priced and potentially taxed. In 2023, China established a National Data Administration to coordinate the data economy. At the same time, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) tightly regulates generative AI. The Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative AI Services entered into force in August 2023, requiring registration, security assessments, and content controls. AI adoption is nonetheless leading globally. According to CNNIC, the number of generative AI users reached approximately 602 million by end-2025. China accounts for around 70% of global AI patents and over 23% of publications, according to the Stanford AI Index 2026. Data is therefore simultaneously tradeable, state-administered, and comprehensively accessible — a commons under state direction.

FAULT LINE

If data is the central raw material of AI value creation, the rules governing its ownership and access will determine who shares in the proceeds. The fault line: China organises data as a state-administered factor of production — this permits trading, pricing and potential taxation at scale, but raises the question of whether individuals and data-supplying companies share in the value created, or whether value accrues predominantly to the state and a handful of platforms. Unlike in private-sector data markets, sovereignty here lies with the state, which simultaneously acts as regulator, exchange operator and beneficiary. This creates scale and controllability, but also a tension between commercial exploitation, the protection of the individual under PIPL and comprehensive state access. The central question through to 2040 is whether China turns data into a broadly shared commons whose proceeds are widely distributed, or whether the data rent concentrates in the hands of the state and a few corporations — and how much individual control over one's own data remains.

02 · POLICY OPTIONS

Paths for China

A
Expanding data exchanges as shared value creation★★★☆☆ 3/5

China deepens the state-run data exchanges so that data-supplying companies, and potentially individuals, share in the value created — through remuneration, data trustees and regulated revenue sharing. This is central because data is the fifth factor of production and the exchanges in Shanghai, Shenzhen and Beijing are already in place. This path turns data into a shared commons. The cost: data valuation is methodologically unproven, and as long as the state is simultaneously regulator, operator and beneficiary, equitable revenue sharing will be difficult to enforce.

+ Turns data into a shared, tradeable commons
– Data valuation unproven; conflict of interest on the part of the state

Trade-off: Broad participation in the data rent versus the state's dual role

Feasibility: Fair only if the state's operator and beneficiary roles are separated

B
Strengthening individual data rights under PIPL★★☆☆☆ 2/5

China is strengthening individual protection and control rights under PIPL so that individuals remain in control of their data and share in its use. This goes to the heart of the matter, because in the AI economy personal data constitutes the raw material. PIPL (2021) already provides a comprehensive framework. The price: individual data rights are in tension with pervasive state access and the use of data as a factor of production — genuine empowerment would limit state visibility, which runs counter to the logic of central governance.

+ Secures individual control over personal data
– Stands in conflict with comprehensive state access

Trade-off: Individual data sovereignty versus state governance

Feasibility: Limits arise from the dual nature of data as a state resource

C
Securing compute sovereignty as the foundation of the data commons★★★☆☆ 3/5

China is expanding its data centres, chips, and energy infrastructure to secure the domestic computing base of the data economy. This matters because data generates value only when combined with computing power — and China remains import-dependent for advanced semiconductors. The country's lead in building out data centres and renewables is telling. The cost: sovereignty over advanced chips remains the most vulnerable point, and the energy appetite of data centres strains climate targets for as long as coal serves as a bridging fuel.

+ Secures the computing base without which data cannot realise its value
– Chip dependency and energy demand remain structural weaknesses

Trade-off: Data sovereignty versus hardware and climate constraints

Feasibility: Contingent on the success of semiconductor self-sufficiency

D
Maintain and extend the CAC's stringent AI governance framework★★★☆☆ 3/5

China is continuing its early, strict regulation of generative AI through the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) — encompassing registration, security assessments, and content controls. This is a logical path, as the Administrative Measures for Generative AI (August 2023) already deliver legal certainty within a framework of limited openness. The approach gives the state control over models and content. The cost: stringent governance may constrain innovation diversity and openness, creating tension with the ambition to lead globally in AI — control and the pace of innovation must be kept in balance.

+ Establishes legal certainty and state control at an early stage
– May constrain innovation diversity and openness

Trade-off: Control and security versus innovation dynamics

Feasibility: Balancing oversight and openness remains a delicate act

03 · TIME HORIZON

Trigger-based phases

Phase 1: Data as a factor of production

Trigger: Data exchanges, the National Data Administration, and the CAC's AI rules establish data as a tradeable, state-administered factor.

China is building the infrastructure to trade, price, and regulate data. AI adoption is leading. Yet who participates in the data rent remains an open question.

Phase 2: Distribution of the data rent

Trigger: Data exchanges, remuneration models, and data rights will determine whether value is broadly shared or concentrated.

China is deciding whether data-contributing companies and individuals participate in value creation from their data, or whether the rent accrues to the state and a small number of platforms. The tension between monetisation, privacy, and state access is coming into plain view.

Phase 3: Data order 2040

Trigger: China has embedded data either as a broadly shared commons or as a state- and platform-concentrated rent.

The ownership, access, and remuneration framework for data is in place. Whether China makes data a broadly shared commons whilst preserving individual control will determine participation and trust through to 2040.

04 · PILOT PROGRAMMES

Real-world pilot programmes

National data exchanges (Shanghai, Shenzhen, Beijing)

Status: Active – state-operated exchanges for trading data products

The state-run data exchanges trade data products and pilot their pricing. They are the test case for whether data can be organised as a tradable factor of production and whether the returns from it can be shared broadly.

Open project

Data 20 Measures and national data authority

Status: Framework since December 2022, administration since 2023 — data as the fifth factor of production

The classification of data as a fifth factor of production and the establishment of the national data authority provide the institutional foundation of the data economy. They reflect China's distinctive approach to administering and exploiting data under state direction.

Open project

Administrative Measures for Generative AI Services (CAC)

Status: In force since August 2023 — registration, security assessment, content controls

The CAC's early AI regulations provide legal certainty while maintaining centralised control over models and content. They are the test case for how China balances the pace of innovation with state oversight of AI.

Open project

Data Protection Law PIPL

Status: In force since November 2021 — comprehensive protection of personal data

PIPL provides a comprehensive framework for the protection of personal data, yet stands in tension with state access. It is the test case for how much individual data sovereignty remains within a state-administered data space.

Open project

05 · EARLY INDICATORS

What we are watching

Distribution of the data rent

What is measured is who participates in the returns from data. The threshold matters because data are the raw material of the AI economy. If the rent concentrates, the data commons remains a state- and platform-held asset. Broader participation would signal that data are becoming a shared resource.

Today: Data exchanges under construction; value concentrated with the state and large platforms
→
Threshold: No broad participation by data-contributing companies and individuals by the mid-2030s
Individual data sovereignty under PIPL

What is measured is how much control individuals retain over their own data. The threshold matters because personal data form the raw material of AI. If control remains weak, power shifts entirely to the data administrator. Strengthened control would signal a balance between commercial exploitation and personal data protection.

Today: Comprehensive protection framework (PIPL 2021), alongside far-reaching state access
→
Threshold: No strengthening of individual control despite growing data use
Compute sovereignty

This indicator measures control over the computational foundation of the data economy. The threshold matters because data creates no value without computing power, and export controls expose this flank directly. Where dependency persists, data sovereignty remains incomplete. A reduction would demonstrate success in achieving self-sufficiency.

Today: Leading expansion of data centres, but import dependency on advanced chips
→
Threshold: No reduction in dependency on advanced semiconductor hardware
06 · OPEN QUESTIONS

What we do not yet know

1. Will China make data a broadly shared commons whose returns benefit many, or will the data rent accumulate with the state and a handful of platforms?
2. How much control over their own data can individuals retain when the state is simultaneously regulator, exchange operator, and beneficiary?
3. Can the value of data be fairly assessed and remunerated when the valuation methodology remains untested?
4. Can China secure compute sovereignty as the foundation of its data economy for as long as it remains dependent on imports of advanced chips?
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