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PILLAR 08 · CARE · CHINA

Care, Health & Social Services

China status: Critical junctureChina Module · Care

A rapidly ageing population is meeting a care infrastructure and financing system that is struggling to keep pace.

01 · STATUS QUO & FAULT LINE

Where does China stand, and where might it break?

STATUS QUO

At the end of 2024, China counted approximately 310 million people aged 60 and above, around 22 per cent of the population; those aged 65 and over accounted for roughly 15.6 per cent (NBS China). According to UN projections, this share will rise to approximately one quarter by 2040, one of the fastest rates of population ageing in the world. China is ageing before it has grown rich: the share of older people is reaching levels that Western countries only saw at far higher per-capita income, whilst the social safety net remains fragmented. Health expenditure stands at around 7 per cent of gross domestic product (World Bank/WHO), well below the OECD average, and households still bear roughly one third of health costs themselves (World Bank). The statutory basic health insurance scheme covers approximately 1.3 billion people, reaching around 95 per cent of the population (NHSA), yet the depth of benefits and reimbursement rates vary considerably between urban and rural areas. The pay-as-you-go pension system is divided: a more generously funded urban scheme for employees and a modestly funded scheme for rural residents and the self-employed. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) warned that, without reform, the central urban pension fund could be exhausted by around 2035. From 2025, China is, for the first time in decades, gradually raising the statutory retirement age — for men from 60 to 63, and for women to 55 or 58, depending on the group, over a 15-year period (MOHRSS China).

FAULT LINE

The automation of office and manufacturing work is narrowing precisely the contribution base from which pension and care systems are financed. If insured wage bills fall whilst the share of those requiring care rises steeply, a funding gap opens that the fragmented system will struggle to close. Traditional family care — for generations the silent backbone of old-age provision — is breaking down under the pressure of a shrinking number of children: a single child is increasingly responsible for two parents and four grandparents, the so-called 4-2-1 pattern. At the same time, professional carers are in short supply by the millions, and the long-term care insurance model launched in 2016 so far covers only selected pilot cities. Access to services, pensions, and clinics remains tied to hukou registration status, leaving migrant workers particularly poorly protected in old age. Whether AI can ease the care burden through robotics and telemedicine, or whether the demographic load will overwhelm public finances, will be decided in the 2030s.

02 · POLICY OPTIONS

Paths for China

A
Unify pension and long-term care insurance at the national level★★★☆☆ 3/5

China consolidates its fragmented provincial and municipal systems into a nationally balanced pension and long-term care insurance scheme, decoupling entitlements from hukou status. This matters because today's fragmentation disadvantages poorer provinces and migrant workers while spreading risk too narrowly. Initial steps have been taken: since 2022, a central equalisation mechanism for urban pensions has been in place, and long-term care insurance is being piloted across around 49 cities. The cost is significant: wealthier coastal provinces would have to cross-subsidise poorer ones, and universal long-term care insurance carries an enormous price tag given the scale of ageing.

+ Spreads demographic risk broadly and includes migrant workers
– Distributional conflict between wealthy and poorer provinces

Trade-off: solidarity and breadth of coverage against fiscal burden on contributing regions

Feasibility: Effective only with reliable central funding and hukou reform

B
Expanding the funded third pillar and the silver economy★★★☆☆ 3/5

Alongside its pay-as-you-go system, China is building a funded private pension scheme and a state-supported senior economy, with the aim of accumulating retirement assets and opening up care as a growth market. This is attractive because the pay-as-you-go system alone cannot bear the weight of ageing, and households currently hold almost all their wealth in property. The private pension account scheme launched in 2022 and the State Council's silver economy plan of 2024 point the way. The risk: funded pensions require stable capital markets, which remain volatile in China, and they are unlikely to reach lower-income groups.

+ Builds funded retirement assets and reduces pressure on the pay-as-you-go system
– Dependent on volatile capital markets; limited reach among lower-income groups

Trade-off: asset accumulation against market risk and social selectivity

Feasibility: Complements the pay-as-you-go system but does not replace it

C
Automating care through robotics, AI, and telemedicine★★☆☆☆ 2/5

China is leveraging its strengths in robotics and AI to offset the shortage of care workers through assistive robots, fall-detection sensors, telemedicine, and smart home care. This goes to the heart of the structural break: the shrinking working-age population cannot supply enough care staff, and China leads the world in robot density (IFR). Intelligent elderly-care pilot projects are under way in several major cities. The challenges are the scale of investment required, acceptance among older people, and the risk that technology-based care cannot substitute for human warmth and may intensify loneliness.

+ Offsets the shortage of care workers by drawing on existing technological strengths
– High costs, limited acceptance, loss of human closeness

Trade-off: efficiency of care delivery against quality of personal care

Feasibility: Viable as a complement to human care, not as a replacement

03 · TIME HORIZON

Trigger-based phases

Phase 1: Growing Pressure

Trigger: The share of those aged 65 and over clearly exceeds the threshold of an ageing society, while the number of contributors per pensioner falls.

Long-term care insurance remains confined to pilot cities, with families bearing the principal burden. The debate over pension sustainability intensifies, and the retirement age rises gradually from 2025.

Phase 2: Funding Gap

Trigger: The central urban pension fund approaches exhaustion, and provinces with unfavourable demographics face payment difficulties.

The state is responding with central equalisation transfers, capital injections from state assets, and an expansion of private pension provision. The care sector is being expanded as a source of employment and growth, with robotics and telemedicine being scaled up.

Phase 3: New Care Settlement

Trigger: A universal pension and long-term care insurance scheme with a funded supplement replaces the fragmented system.

China finds a new balance between pay-as-you-go, funded provision, family care, and automation. Whether this succeeds before ageing reaches its peak will determine the degree of social cohesion through to 2040.

04 · PILOT PROGRAMMES

Real-world pilot programmes

Long-term care insurance pilot (since 2016, approximately 49 cities)

Status: Under piloting (gradual expansion planned)

Since 2016, China has been testing a statutory long-term care insurance scheme in selected cities, including Qingdao and Shanghai, designed to cover care needs in old age. The pilot is intended to establish whether a fifth branch of social insurance can be financed in the face of ageing, before a nationwide rollout.

Open project

Retirement age reform (from 2025)

Status: In force (increase phased over 15 years)

For the first time in decades, China is raising the statutory retirement age from 2025 — to 63 for men and to 55 or 58 for women, respectively (MOHRSS China). The measure extends the contribution period and is a test case for how much demographic adjustment is politically sustainable.

Open project

State Council Silver Economy Plan (2024)

Status: Being implemented (national guidelines)

Adopted in January 2024, the first national plan for the silver economy brings together care, health services, age-appropriate housing and smart assistance into a single growth field. It represents an attempt to reframe ageing as an economic sector rather than a burden.

Open project

05 · EARLY INDICATORS

What we are watching

Contributors per pensioner (old-age dependency ratio)

This measures how many workers fund a single retiree. The threshold matters because a pay-as-you-go system cannot be sustained through contributions alone once a critical ratio is breached. When the figure tips, the result is either fiscal transfers, higher contributions or benefit cuts. For the stability of the welfare system, this is the central early indicator.

Today: Around 22 per cent of the population are aged 60 or above (NBS China), with the trend rising steeply
→
Threshold: A decline to well below two contributors per pensioner in the core systems
Long-term care insurance coverage

This indicator shows whether professional care provision is keeping pace with an ageing population. The threshold matters because, without comprehensive insurance coverage, the burden falls entirely on families and their dwindling younger relatives. If the expansion stalls, the care gap widens precisely where demographics are most unfavourable.

Today: Limited to around 49 pilot cities
→
Threshold: No nationwide expansion by the end of the 2020s despite rising care needs
Out-of-pocket share of healthcare expenditure

This indicator measures the extent to which healthcare is financed privately rather than through collective risk-sharing. The threshold matters because a high out-of-pocket share can rapidly lead to impoverishment in old age. If it does not fall, health insurance will remain shallow despite broad coverage — a risk to social cohesion in an ageing society.

Today: Households bear roughly one third of healthcare expenditure directly (World Bank)
→
Threshold: No further reduction in the out-of-pocket share despite a rising burden of age-related illness
06 · OPEN QUESTIONS

What we do not yet know

1. Can a shrinking working-age base sustain the pension and care burden of an ageing society before funded pillars are sufficiently built up?
2. Can social protection be decoupled from hukou status, so that migrant workers are also provided for in old age?
3. Can automated care substitute for the shortage of personnel without displacing human attention?
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