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PILLAR 03 · OWNERSHIP · CHINA

Value Creation & Ownership

Status China: In preparationChina module · Ownership

The state and sovereign funds are the central owners of capital; private wealth formation is concentrated and heavily tied to real estate.

01 · STATUS QUO & FAULT LINE

Where does China stand, and where might it break?

STATUS QUO

China's system of property ownership follows a different logic from that of the West. The state is the dominant capital owner. At the end of 2024, state-owned enterprises reported total assets of approximately 401 trillion yuan (SASAC / Global Times). Through sovereign funds, guidance funds, and state-affiliated banks, Beijing deliberately channels capital into key technologies. Private wealth accumulation has grown considerably but remains concentrated and heavily locked into a single asset class: approximately 60 per cent of household wealth is tied up in property (PBoC), while broad participation in equities and capital markets is limited and the stock market remains volatile. Following the collapse of the property market, this became a concentration risk for large swathes of the population, whose primary store of wealth lost value. Western-style cooperatives or widespread employee ownership play virtually no role; in their place stands state-directed capital. The common prosperity policy (gongtong fuyu) is rhetorically aimed at broader participation, but in practice relies more on redistribution and regulation than on a wide dispersal of ownership. R&D expenditure stands at approximately 2.7 per cent of GDP (NBS China / OECD). The capital stock is growing, partly state-financed, and the returns accrue predominantly to state-affiliated entities.

FAULT LINE

If AI redirects returns from labour to capital, it is the state as owner that benefits disproportionately in China, with individual households gaining only to a limited extent. The structural break: as productivity rises through AI, robotics and automation, the broader population remains exposed through property — the weakest link — and holds barely any stake in the productive capital stock of the new economy, which is overwhelmingly state-owned. This risks a wealth divide of a distinctive kind: not primarily between private capital owners and workers as in the West, but between a capital-rich state sector and households whose wealth is tied up in a weakened property market. Weak domestic consumption compounds the problem. Households without capital income and with uncertain property assets save as a precaution rather than consume. China is seeking the answer in broader capital participation: distributions from state assets, stronger capital markets, and a diversification of household wealth beyond property.

02 · POLICY OPTIONS

Paths for China

A
Promoting broad capital participation among households★★☆☆☆ 2/5

China opens its productive capital stock to households — through more stable capital markets, employee ownership schemes, and a diversification away from the singular reliance on property. This matters because approximately 60 per cent of household wealth is held in property (PBoC) and broad equity participation remains low. In an AI economy in which capital benefits disproportionately, a share in productive capital is the lever against the wealth divide. The trade-off: a volatile equity market and low trust make broad dispersal difficult, and the state relinquishes control only reluctantly.

+ Gives broad segments of the population a stake in productive capital
– Volatile markets and low investor confidence impede diversification

Trade-off: participation versus state control over the capital stock

Feasibility: Requires stable, trustworthy capital markets

B
Distributions from state assets as a citizen dividend★★★☆☆ 3/5

Rather than dispersing ownership widely, China gives the population a share in returns on capital through distributions from state investment funds. This is a natural fit, given that the state is the central owner with approximately 401 trillion yuan in assets held through state-owned enterprises (SASAC, end of 2024), and AI-generated capital income partly accrues there. The approach is consistent with the existing order and requires no privatisation. The trade-off: so long as distributions remain tied to contribution and residency status, they reinforce existing inequalities, and the low payout ratios of state-owned enterprises limit the impact.

+ Gives the population a share in returns on capital without privatisation
– Tied to status; constrained by low payout ratios

Trade-off: a share in returns versus a share in ownership

Feasibility: Broad impact requires mandatory, status-independent distributions

C
Diversifying household wealth beyond property★★☆☆☆ 2/5

China redirects the high savings rate from property into productive, more broadly diversified assets — through a funded third pillar, fund products, and more stable equity markets. This addresses the core of the fault line, because the concentrated exposure to property hit broad segments of the population after the market downturn. The development of private pension provision since 2022 points in this direction. The trade-off: the reallocation will only succeed if the alternatives are perceived as secure. After years of volatile equity markets and a property crisis, trust is limited and precautionary saving remains elevated.

+ Reduces households' concentrated exposure to property
– Low confidence in investment alternatives following the market downturn

Trade-off: diversification versus perceived security

Feasibility: Requires reliable, trustworthy investment products

D
Securing common prosperity through redistribution★★★☆☆ 3/5

Rather than broadening asset ownership, China is relying on redistribution, regulation and public services to distribute the gains of the AI economy widely. This is consistent with its existing common prosperity policy. The approach is compatible with the prevailing ownership structure and can be implemented quickly. Its cost: redistribution without broad capital participation leaves the structural divide between a capital-rich state sector and capital-poor households intact. It can also weaken investment incentives if it is perceived as unpredictable.

+ Compatible with the ownership structure, effective quickly
– Does not resolve the structural divide; may dampen investment

Trade-off: Distributional impact today versus structural participation

Feasibility: Alleviates symptoms without resolving the question of ownership

03 · TIME HORIZON

Trigger-based phases

Phase 1: Visible divide

Trigger: The property market downturn erodes the central store of household wealth, while the state's capital stock grows in AI and technology.

The gap between a capital-rich state sector and capital-poor households becomes visible. Weak domestic consumption and a high savings rate reinforce one another, and the debate over broader participation begins.

Phase 2: Opening of participation

Trigger: Distributions from state assets begin, and household wealth starts to diversify beyond property.

China begins to allow the population to share in capital returns through dividends and more stable capital markets. The question of how much ownership and control the state cedes becomes the central point of contention.

Phase 3: New ownership balance

Trigger: A structural stake for households in productive capital — via dividend, capital markets, or both — is established.

China finds a new balance between state capital ownership and broad participation. Whether this succeeds without surrendering the state's steering capacity or cementing the wealth divide will determine social cohesion through to 2040.

04 · PILOT PROGRAMMES

Real-world pilot programmes

Transfer of state-owned enterprise stakes to the social security fund

Status: Ongoing — transfer of SOE stakes to the national pension reserve fund

China is transferring stakes in state-owned enterprises to the national social security fund to address future pension shortfalls. This represents the most concrete test case for how the state can channel its capital assets, indirectly, to the benefit of the broader population.

Open project

Common Prosperity policy (gongtong fuyu)

Status: Policy guideline since 2021 — Zhejiang pilot zone

Zhejiang Province serves as a demonstration zone for common prosperity, with measures covering income, public services, and redistribution. It is the test case for whether broad participation can be achieved through redistribution rather than the dispersal of ownership.

Open project

Registration-based stock market and STAR Market

Status: Reform implemented — STAR Market technology exchange in Shanghai active

Through capital market reform and the STAR Market technology exchange, China is seeking to deepen its capital markets and channel household capital into productive technology companies. This will show whether broad capital participation via the stock market is achievable.

Open project

Private pension provision (third pillar)

Status: Launched in 2022, nationwide since December 2024

The funded private pension account is designed to redirect household wealth from property into more diversified investments. It is the test case for diversifying household assets that are disproportionately tied up in a single asset class.

Open project

05 · EARLY INDICATORS

What we are watching

Share of property in household wealth

What is measured here is the concentration risk within private wealth. The figure matters because a high property share keeps broad sections of the population anchored to the weakest link in the AI economy. If that share remains elevated, households miss out on participation in productive capital. A decline signals genuine diversification of wealth.

Today: Approximately 60 per cent of household wealth tied up in property (PBoC)
→
Threshold: No meaningful diversification despite market downturn
Broad capital market participation

This measures how broadly the population participates in productive capital. The threshold matters because in an AI economy capital captures a disproportionate share of returns. If participation remains low, household wealth formation decouples from value creation. If it rises, the capital stock becomes more broadly accessible.

Today: Low share of households holding equities or funds; volatile market (CSRC / PBoC)
→
Threshold: No sustained increase in participation by the end of the 2020s
State share of key capital

This measures the concentration of the capital stock in state hands. The figure matters because AI rents accrue predominantly to the state. If the share remains unchanged, broad participation depends entirely on distributions. Any opening would signal a new balance between the state and households.

Today: State the dominant owner, with approximately 401 trillion yuan in state-owned enterprise assets (SASAC, end-2024)
→
Threshold: No opening towards broader household participation
06 · OPEN QUESTIONS

What we do not yet know

1. Can China give broad sections of the population a stake in productive capital without relinquishing the state's control over the capital stock?
2. Can the concentrated exposure to property in household wealth be unwound, given the limited confidence in alternative investments following the equity and real-estate crises?
3. Will shared prosperity be achieved through ownership participation, or will it remain confined to redistribution and regulation?
Does the state give the population a genuine share of capital returns — or does the status-linked dividend reproduce the existing wealth divide?
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