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← All 14 pillars for ChinaCountries › China › Pillar 04 of 14
PILLAR 04 · LABOUR · CHINA

Work & Contribution

Status China: In preparationChina module · Labour

A leading position in robotisation, but the social safety net for workers navigating the transition is still being built; migrant workers face disadvantages under the hukou system.

01 · STATUS QUO & FAULT LINE

Where does China stand, and where might it break?

STATUS QUO

China is a manufacturing and robotics superpower. According to the International Federation of Robotics (IFR), the country now operates well over two million industrial robots and, by around 2023, had already surpassed Germany and Japan in robot density (IFR). Automation raises productivity, but it is hitting routine work in manufacturing and office environments simultaneously, while demographic contraction further amplifies the pressure to automate. At the same time, the labour market has had to absorb a record number of university graduates: in 2025, more than twelve million new graduates entered the market (MOE China). Youth unemployment among 16- to 24-year-olds (excluding students) peaked at approximately 21.3 per cent in June 2023. Following a suspension and a methodological revision, NBS China continued to report double-digit figures in 2024 and 2025. Around 300 million migrant workers (NBS China, approximately 299 million in 2024) form the backbone of manufacturing, construction and basic services, yet remain only partially protected owing to their lack of urban hukou registration. An entrenched work ethic — epitomised by the so-called 996 culture, the informal norm of working from nine in the morning until nine at night, six days a week — coexists with a younger counter-movement: tang ping, or "lying flat", which represents a withdrawal from competitive pressure. State-organised retraining through the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) serves as the principal bridge for career transitions.

FAULT LINE

China is caught between two opposing forces: its working-age population is shrinking demographically, making automation necessary — yet that same automation is simultaneously eroding the livelihoods of migrant workers and office employees. The fault line: AI and robotics can support a narrowing labour base and raise productivity — or displace millions of workers in routine roles and university graduates before new forms of employment emerge, with poorly protected migrant workers bearing the greatest risk. The outcome hinges on the speed at which the state can transition workers into new roles in an orderly fashion. The high level of youth unemployment already signals that the labour market is struggling to absorb well-qualified cohorts — a warning sign ahead of the AI wave. At the same time, care and welfare work is being revalued in the context of an ageing population, and is increasingly being remunerated, creating new employment. China is seeking its answer in large-scale, state-organised retraining, an upgrading of care and infrastructure work, and stronger protection for workers in transition — above all for migrant workers.

02 · POLICY OPTIONS

Paths for China

A
State-organised retraining at scale★★★☆☆ 3/5

China is expanding further training and development through MOHRSS into a nationwide standard. The aim is to enable workers to transition in an orderly way from exposed roles into new ones. This matters because China leads globally on robot density (IFR) and automation is hitting manufacturing and office work simultaneously. The existing retraining infrastructure and centralised coordination give China both speed and scale. The trade-off: retraining only works if real, productive jobs exist at the end of the process. The high level of youth unemployment shows that training alone does not generate demand.

+ Leverages China's centralised coordination for speed and scale
– Upskilling without demand does not create employment

Trade-off: adaptability versus the limits of labour demand

Feasibility: Only effective when coupled with genuinely emerging fields of activity

B
Upgrade and guarantee care and infrastructure work★★★☆☆ 3/5

China is upgrading care, nursing and infrastructure work and, in part, guaranteeing it as employment — enabling the state to absorb labour displaced by automation. This goes to the heart of the issue, because ageing is driving a steep rise in care needs and care is one of the few growth areas that is resilient to disruption. The approach is well suited to state-led coordination and creates employment where genuine demand exists. The trade-off: care and infrastructure work is characterised by high labour intensity, is often poorly remunerated and is fiscally costly. Raising its value requires sustained high levels of public expenditure.

+ Creates employment where ageing generates demand
– Fiscally expensive, often poorly remunerated

Trade-off: Social employment versus fiscal burden

Feasibility: Only viable with adequate pay and social protection

C
Securing transitions, particularly for migrant workers★★★☆☆ 3/5

China is providing social protection for transitions between occupations and decoupling that protection from the hukou system. The aim is to prevent automation from leaving the most vulnerable groups without a safety net. This matters because approximately 300 million migrant workers (NBS China) form the backbone of exposed manufacturing, often without full access to social protection at their place of work. The cost: better protection for mobile transitions places strain on local governments and requires a reform of the hukou system that is both politically and fiscally arduous.

+ Protects the most exposed, mobile working population
– Burdens local governments, requires hukou reform

Trade-off: Social protection versus municipal fiscal viability

Feasibility: Inseparable from hukou reform

D
Managing automation as a response to labour shortages★★★☆☆ 3/5

China is deploying robotics and AI deliberately to compensate for a demographically shrinking labour force, rather than allowing automation to displace jobs in an unplanned fashion. This is a logical response given that the working-age population is declining and robot density is already among the highest in the world (IFR). The approach turns scarcity into a source of productivity strength where labour is in short supply. The cost: automation does not always follow demographic need. It also affects sectors with a surplus of workers — such as recent graduates — and can thereby generate both shortages and unemployment simultaneously.

+ Turns demographic scarcity into a productivity strength
– Automation also affects areas with a labour surplus

Trade-off: Productivity versus an orderly distribution of labour

Feasibility: Requires active management to prevent shortages and unemployment from coexisting

03 · TIME HORIZON

Trigger-based phases

Phase 1: Dual pressure

Trigger: Automation reduces routine jobs in manufacturing and office work, while youth unemployment remains high.

High robot density and AI systems are displacing millions of routine occupations even as the working-age population shrinks demographically. The state is rolling out large-scale retraining funds, and the debates around 996 and tang ping are intensifying.

Phase 2: Reshaping of labour

Trigger: Care and infrastructure work is upgraded in status, retraining is rolled out at scale, and protection for transitions is improved.

China is shifting employment away from exposed routine work towards care, social services, and AI-complementary occupations. Tensions over the protection of migrant workers and the financing of transitions are coming openly to the fore.

Phase 3: New labour order

Trigger: Automation supports the narrow labour base, while orderly transitions and an enhanced status for care work sustain employment.

China is finding a new balance between automation, retraining and care work. Whether it can do so without shortages and unemployment coexisting will determine social stability through to 2040.

04 · PILOT PROGRAMMES

Real-world pilot programmes

State retraining programmes (MOHRSS)

Status: Ongoing — subsidised vocational education and upskilling

The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security is organising subsidised retraining and vocational education at scale. This is the central test of whether China can transfer workers in an orderly manner from exposed occupations into new roles before automation and demographic change take full effect.

Open project

Dark factories and lights-out manufacturing

Status: Operational. Fully automated factories, including at Xiaomi and in electronics manufacturing

Fully automated, partly lights-out factories illustrate how far robotisation in China has advanced. They are the test case for how automation compensates for a shrinking labour force — and for which tasks remain in human hands.

Open project

Hukou relaxation for migrant workers

Status: Ongoing — improved access to urban services outside the major metropolitan areas

The gradual relaxation of the Hukou system improves the safety net for approximately 300 million migrant workers during occupational transitions. It is the test case for whether transitions can be cushioned socially for the most exposed group.

Open project

05 · EARLY INDICATORS

What we are watching

Youth unemployment (ages 16–24, excluding students)

This measures how well the labour market absorbs well-educated cohorts. The indicator matters because a high rate — even before the full AI wave arrives — signals that labour demand is already lagging behind supply. Should it remain elevated, automation will compound the problem. For social stability, this is a central early indicator.

Today: Peak of approximately 21.3 per cent in June 2023, remaining in double digits thereafter (NBS China)
→
Threshold: Persistently high or rising rate despite economic growth
Robot density

This measures the pace of automation. The indicator matters because an increase unaccompanied by retraining and social protection means displacement rather than relief. If robotisation outpaces adjustment, serious dislocations follow. If, on the other hand, it supports a shrinking labour force, it becomes a strength.

Today: China overtook Germany and Japan around 2023, with more than two million industrial robots in operation (IFR)
→
Threshold: Rapid further increase without parallel retraining and social protection
Protection during transitions (migrant workers)

This measures how well the most exposed group is supported through transitions. The indicator matters because automation hits manufacturing and low-skilled services first. If social protection remains weak, millions will fall through the net. An increase signals that transitions are proceeding in an orderly fashion.

Today: Approximately 300 million migrant workers (NBS China), many without full access to social protection at their place of work
→
Threshold: No discernible increase in protection coverage when workers change occupations
06 · OPEN QUESTIONS

What we do not yet know

1. Can China steer automation deliberately to compensate for demographic scarcity without simultaneously displacing graduates and migrant workers?
2. Is state-organised retraining sufficient, when today's youth unemployment already shows that upskilling alone does not create demand?
3. Can care and nursing work be sufficiently upgraded and remunerated to genuinely absorb the labour freed up by AI?
4. Can the transitions of some 300 million migrant workers be secured before automation renders their roles obsolete?
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