Income & Economic Security
Fragmented pension system divided between urban and rural populations, under pressure from ageing; the retirement age is rising incrementally from 2025.
Where does China stand, and where might it break?
China's social safety net rests on several unevenly resourced pillars. The Dibao minimum living standard scheme provides a floor for the poorest, though entitlements vary considerably by region and urban-rural status. The pension system is bifurcated: the pension for urban employees is comparatively adequate, whereas the pension for rural residents and urban workers without enterprise affiliation is built on a very low flat-rate base. The central fault line is the hukou: those holding urban registered status enjoy full access to pensions, healthcare, education and housing at their place of residence; the approximately 300 million migrant workers (NBS China counts around 299 million migrants in 2024) frequently do not, and remain only partially protected. Demographic pressure is intense. The share of the population aged over 65 is on course to reach around one quarter by 2040 (UN / NBS China), even as the working-age base shrinks. In response, China is gradually raising the statutory retirement age from 2025 over a 15-year period — for men from 60 to 63, and for women from 50 to 55 or from 55 to 58, depending on the group (MOHRSS China). The funded third pillar launched in 2022 and was rolled out nationally in 2024, but remains small. Household saving rates stay high because private provision substitutes for a large share of social protection.
If paid employment disappears through AI and automation, millions will lose their income and, through the contribution-linked system, part of their pension and healthcare entitlements as well — migrant workers without urban hukou registration being particularly exposed. China faces a double bind: the number of contributors is falling due to ageing and automation, while the number of beneficiaries is rising steeply, and the fragmented, regionally separated system is ill-equipped to redistribute burdens across provinces. In many areas, pensions for rural and non-urban residents amount to only a few hundred yuan per month — insufficient to cover basic needs once employment as a supplement disappears. Because entitlements are tied to residential status, the mobile population that is most exposed to automation risks falling through the net. China is seeking answers in decoupling basic social protection from the hukou system, raising and harmonising pension levels, and distributing proceeds from state equity funds. The transition is under way, but not yet complete.
Paths for China
China is gradually decoupling access to Dibao, basic pensions and healthcare from residency status and linking it instead to actual place of residence. This is significant because around 300 million migrant workers (NBS China) currently have only limited social protection — and it is precisely they who are hardest hit by automation in manufacturing and low-skilled services. Pilot schemes to relax the hukou system in smaller cities point the way forward. The cost: decoupling places a heavy burden on the budgets of destination cities, whose expenditure on social services and education rises sharply without a commensurate increase in funding.
Trade-off: broad participation versus local fiscal affordability
Feasibility: Barely viable without fiscal equalisation between regions
China is raising the low basic pension for rural and non-urban residents and consolidating the fragmented provincial systems into a more national pooling arrangement. This matters because the gap between the urban employment-based pension and the flat-rate amount paid to everyone else cements inequality in old age. The phased increase in the retirement age begun in 2025 (MOHRSS China) and higher basic flat rates move in this direction. The fiscal cost is substantial: a meaningful increase for hundreds of millions of rural residents requires sustained, large transfers from the central budget.
Trade-off: social equity versus fiscal burden
Feasibility: Only viable with greater consolidation of pension funds at national level
China is channelling returns from state-owned enterprises and equity funds into basic social protection — in part as a form of citizens' dividend, often linked to contribution and residential status. This is a natural fit, given that the state is the principal capital owner, holding approximately ¥401 trillion in assets through state-owned enterprises (SASAC, end-2024), and that a share of the gains from AI will accrue there. Stakes in state-owned enterprises are already being transferred to the National Social Security Fund. The caveat is that as long as distributions remain tied to hukou status, they risk reinforcing existing inequalities rather than dissolving them.
Trade-off: a share of the Capital Dividend against equal treatment
Feasibility: Socially effective only if distributions are decoupled from residency status
China is strengthening the tax-incentivised private pension scheme launched in 2022 in order to relieve pressure on pay-as-you-go systems and put the high household saving rate to productive use. This matters because per capita pension assets are low and household wealth is heavily concentrated in property. The downside is that a funded pillar primarily benefits higher earners with capacity to save, offering little to migrant workers and rural residents who have the weakest access — and may in fact widen inequality.
Trade-off: systemic relief versus broad social reach
Feasibility: A complement to, not a substitute for, basic social protection
Trigger-based phases
Trigger: automation and ageing hit first the poorly protected migrant workers and rural residents, whose basic pension no longer covers subsistence.
The fragmentation between urban and rural systems and the link to hukou status are becoming a visible problem. The state is raising the retirement age and increasing basic flat-rate payments without closing the structural divide.
Trigger: basic social protection is gradually decoupled from hukou status, and pensions are increasingly pooled at national level and raised.
China shifts the basis of subsistence protection away from pure contribution and status logic towards broader basic coverage, supplemented by distributions from equity funds. Conflicts between destination and origin regions over financing come openly to the fore.
Trigger: a nationally pooled basic protection scheme covers old age, health and subsistence largely independent of residential status.
China is establishing a new balance between basic provision, pay-as-you-go, funded savings and a Capital Dividend. Whether this succeeds against a shrinking contributory base and indebted municipalities will determine social cohesion through to 2040.
Real-world pilot programmes
Status: In force since January 2025 — phased increase over 15 years (MOHRSS China)
China is raising the retirement age for men to 63 and for women to 55 or 58, depending on category. It is the most significant intervention in the country's pension architecture to date, and the test case for whether the funding gap created by an ageing society can be brought under control.
Status: Ongoing — relaxation of residency restrictions outside the megacities
China is easing access to urban hukou registration in many cities, in order to give migrant workers better access to pensions, healthcare and education. The process is the test case for whether social protection can genuinely be decoupled from residential status.
Status: Active — receives stakes in state-owned enterprises to cover future pension liabilities
The state reserve fund is capitalised with stakes in state-owned enterprises to cushion the future pension shortfall. It illustrates how China uses the state as a capital owner to underpin pay-as-you-go systems.
Status: launched in 2022, rolled out nationwide since December 2024 — with tax incentives
The tax-advantaged private pension account is designed to channel the high household savings rate into productive use and reduce pressure on pay-as-you-go systems. It is the test case for building a funded complement to the state pension.
What we are watching
This indicator measures the inequality in retirement provision between urban and rural populations. It matters because the least-protected group is simultaneously the most exposed to automation. If the gap persists, old age becomes a poverty risk for hundreds of millions. Convergence would signal a serious restructuring of basic income security.
This indicator measures how far the hukou linkage excludes the mobile working population from social protection. It matters because this group bears the hardest impact of the automation wave. If the coverage rate remains low, these workers fall through the social safety net. An increase would signal a genuine decoupling from residential status.
The old-age dependency ratio measures the proportion of the retired population relative to the working-age base. It matters because the fragmented pay-as-you-go systems are struggling to keep pace with the speed of ageing. If demographic change outpaces the reform of these systems, a permanent funding gap will emerge. For the savings rate and domestic consumption, this is a key indicator.