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AI FOOTPRINTlimitedASSESSMENT 2026GLOBALANCEINTELLIGENCE
Globalance AI Footprint

Assessment as of November 2026 · next assessment 2027.

Result of the assessment by the Globalance research team under the published methodology. Not a certification or quality label.

How we assess ›

How this rating is builtVideo · 0:52
GI 100 Index · Profile

Tesla Inc

USAAdoptersAssignment FullData quality Medium

Key messagelimited AI Footprint

Tesla has set out board oversight of artificial intelligence but publishes no rules of its own for its use, and it has received a European approval for its supervised driving system. However, a court ruling on a fatal crash, several ongoing investigations by the US road safety authority and a Californian decision on misleading advertising show considerable weaknesses in safety and openness.

Opportunities

  • In the Globalance AI Footprint, none of the three pillars rates higher than «limited». The company is in the index because of its role in the AI value chain.

Risks

  • Responsibilitylimited

    AI-specific oversight is documented at board level: the Audit Committee charter of September 2025 explicitly assigns the committee oversight of AI policies as well as data privacy and data security, the governance guidelines anchor board oversight of the AI strategy, and the 2026 proxy confirms the …

    AI-specific oversight is documented at board level: the Audit Committee charter of September 2025 explicitly assigns the committee oversight of AI policies as well as data privacy and data security, the governance guidelines anchor board oversight of the AI strategy, and the 2026 proxy confirms the review of risks from «super intelligence» (S32, S33, S17). However, Tesla publishes neither an AI policy with operational content nor a described approval, risk classification or review procedure for its own and purchased AI, such as FSD releases or the in-vehicle voice assistant (S13, S19); the pillar is therefore only “limited”. Complaints channels are documented only in general terms (S32), and the pillar contains only minor controversies on shareholder proposals and lawsuits concerning the CEO's other companies, with no documented material weakness (S18, S27, S11).

  • Safetylimited

    Against the documented practice stand serious weaknesses with grade-A evidence: a federal court upheld the jury verdict of USD 242.57 million for design defect and failure to warn in Autopilot (S30, S29), and NHTSA documented in EA22-002 at least 13 fatal crashes involving foreseeable misuse, after …

    Against the documented practice stand serious weaknesses with grade-A evidence: a federal court upheld the jury verdict of USD 242.57 million for design defect and failure to warn in Autopilot (S30, S29), and NHTSA documented in EA22-002 at least 13 fatal crashes involving foreseeable misuse, after which Tesla recalled around two million vehicles; the authority is still reviewing the recall's effectiveness (S07). In addition there are ongoing proceedings on FSD in reduced visibility and traffic violations, as well as late crash reports (S06, S08, S09). On the positive side, the European type approval by the RDW after independent tests, driver monitoring that cannot be switched off, ISO 27001 certification and a bug bounty programme are documented (S21, S45, S15, S41); the pillar cap nevertheless limits the rating to «limited».

  • Transparencylimited

    On 2025-12-16 the California DMV found that Tesla had advertised misleadingly with «Autopilot» and «Full Self-Driving Capability»; this is a serious violation with grade-A evidence in communicating the capabilities and limits of the AI, even though Tesla has since adjusted its advertising (S02, S01, S31).

    On 2025-12-16 the California DMV found that Tesla had advertised misleadingly with «Autopilot» and «Full Self-Driving Capability»; this is a serious violation with grade-A evidence in communicating the capabilities and limits of the AI, even though Tesla has since adjusted its advertising (S02, S01, S31). According to a media analysis, Tesla also redacts almost all crash descriptions in its NHTSA reports, and researchers criticise the comparison basis of its safety statistics (S40, S42). Documented on the other side are detailed warnings in the manual, a published methodology for the safety statistics and the disclosure of robotaxi crash reports from May 2026 (S45, S23, S39); model or system cards are missing.

  • Controversyserious

    A jury in Miami found Tesla partly responsible for a fatal 2019 Autopilot crash (design defect, failure to warn); the court upheld the verdict, Tesla has appealed.

What lies behind the assessment

Research of 3 November 2026
42searches
48pages and documents read
10primary documents
15controversies checked
6open points, named openly
The full research: pillars, evidence, controversies and open points
AI Footprint · Adopter · As of 3 November 2026
Tesla IncOverall rating: limited

Tesla assigns oversight of AI policies to the Audit Committee but does not publish the rules. A court ruling on a fatal crash, NHTSA findings and misleading advertising weigh heavily.

Safety

40 %
limitedsolidstrong

A court ruling and regulatory findings on fatal crashes outweigh positive tests.

  • +European type approval by the RDW after independent tests Source ↗
  • +ISO 27001 certification, penetration testing and bug bounty Source ↗
  • –Court upheld jury verdict on fatal Autopilot crash Source ↗
  • –NHTSA found at least 13 fatal crashes involving misuse Source ↗
  • –Proceedings on reduced visibility, red lights and late reports Source ↗
All sources for this pillar (23)

Transparency

20 %
limitedsolidstrong

An authority found misleading advertising, and crash data is largely redacted.

  • +Manual sets out limits and driver responsibility in detail Source ↗
  • +Methodology of the safety statistics is published Source ↗
  • –DMV found misleading advertising for Autopilot and FSD Source ↗
  • –Crash descriptions in NHTSA reports redacted, according to an analysis Source ↗
All sources for this pillar (12)
What is missing for “strong”

These steps are in the company’s own hands.

1Responsibility
Publish the AI policies

Tesla should publish the AI policies referred to in the Audit Committee charter, including the approval procedure for software releases.

2Safety
Demonstrably remedy driver assistance flaws

Tesla should demonstrate the effectiveness of the recall and updates to NHTSA and report crashes on time.

3Transparency
Disclose crash data and limits

Tesla should report crash descriptions unredacted, publish a safety report on FSD and advertise its capabilities with restraint.

Context: 101 companies assessed

Distribution of overall ratings, no ranking
strong
none yet
solid
limited
← Tesla Inc is one of 66

No company reaches “strong” today. Disclosure on how companies handle AI is still young across the market.

Controversies
15 3 serious, 7 medium, 5 minor

No deduction for controversies.

Largest risk area
Fatal crashes involving driver assistance

A federal court upheld a jury verdict over an Autopilot design defect, and NHTSA found at least 13 fatal crashes involving foreseeable misuse.

How thoroughly assessed
46 Evidence

10 primary documents read, 42 searches.

Read the full reasoning and all sources
Tesla Inc · Full reasoning

AI oversight without published rules, plus a court ruling on driving safety

Overall rating “limited”. No deduction for controversies. The superscript numbers link directly to the source.

1 · Responsibility

limitedWeight 40%

Oversight of AI is anchored in the board, but without a published AI policy or a described approval procedure the rating remains “limited”.

What is documented
  • The Audit Committee charter of September 2025 assigns the committee oversight of AI policies, data privacy and data security1
  • The governance guidelines anchor board oversight of strategy implementation, including on AI2
  • According to the 2026 proxy, the Audit Committee reviews risks including cybersecurity and «super intelligence»3
  • The Audit Committee charter sets out general complaints and whistleblower procedures1
The case against
Rules not public
  • The internal AI policies referred to in the Audit Committee charter were not found1
  • No approval procedure for FSD releases or for purchased in-vehicle AI is documented; the 10-K treats AI only as a business risk4
  • There is no named person responsible for AI safety in senior management
Oversight without evidence of implementation
  • Only the charter and proxy are documented; AI figures, training and external audits are missing1 3
  • A shareholder proposal on the direction of AI and robotics could be excluded on formal grounds9
Sources for Responsibility (11)
  1. Tesla, Inc.: Audit Committee Charter (amended 2025-09-03) · 3 September 2025 · primary source
  2. Tesla, Inc.: Corporate Governance Guidelines (as of 2025-09-03) · 3 September 2025 · primary source
  3. Tesla, Inc. (SEC EDGAR): Proxy Statement (DEF 14A) for the annual meeting of 2026-12-03 · 19 October 2026 · primary source
  4. Tesla, Inc. (SEC EDGAR): Form 10-K for financial year 2025 · 31 December 2025 · primary source
  5. Tesla Oracle: Grok AI comes to Tesla vehicles in Europe with the 2026.2.6 software update (official release notes) · 20 February 2026 · secondary source
  6. Tesla, Inc.: Impact Report (archive page) · 3 November 2026 · secondary source
  7. manuals.plus (copy): Tesla Impact Report 2024 (Highlights) · 3 November 2026 · secondary source
  8. Tesla North: Tesla 2025 Impact Report Highlights Path to 'Amazing Abundance' · 7 July 2026 · secondary source
  9. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance: Tesla, Inc. – response to no-action request (Rule 14a-8), proponent Michael McCutcheon · 30 April 2025 · primary source
  10. Bloomberg Law: Tesla Shareholders Didn't Approve of Investment in Musk's xAI · 7 November 2025 · secondary source
  11. Tesla, Inc. (SEC EDGAR): Form 10-Q as of 2026-09-30, Note Commitments and Contingencies (R19) · 21 October 2026 · primary source

2 · Safety

limitedWeight 40%

A European approval after independent tests and a certified security management system are documented, but a court ruling and several NHTSA proceedings show serious flaws in driver assistance.

What is documented
  • After more than 3,000 test hours and independent recalculation of Tesla's data, the RDW granted a European type approval for FSD (Supervised)1
  • Driver monitoring via the cabin camera cannot be switched off; repeated violations lead to suspension21
  • The 10-K describes an ISO/IEC 27001-certified management system, external penetration tests, an incident process and exercises16
  • A product security programme offers researchers safe harbour and registered research vehicles17
  • Camera data is processed only in the vehicle by default and shared for training only with consent18
The case against
Court and authority find flaws
  • A jury found a design defect and failure to warn in a fatal Autopilot crash; the court upheld the verdict, Tesla has appealed3 4
  • In EA22-002 NHTSA documented at least 13 fatal crashes; whether the recall of around two million vehicles is sufficient remains open5
Ongoing proceedings
  • NHTSA is investigating whether FSD detects reduced camera visibility too late, and is reviewing traffic violations such as running red lights6 9
  • Tesla filed 123 crash reports months late; NHTSA is reviewing this in an audit22
  • The robotaxi service has reported several crashes since June 2025, two of them under remote operation12 13
Sources for Safety (23)
  1. RDW (Rijksdienst voor het Wegverkeer): Explanatory note on type approval FSD Supervised · 17 June 2026 · primary source
  2. Electrek: NHTSA closes Tesla Smart Summon investigation (159 incidents) · 6 April 2026 · secondary source
  3. U.S. District Court S.D. Florida (CourtListener RECAP): Benavides v. Tesla, ECF 612: Order on Amended Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, Alternatively, Motion for New Trial · 20 February 2026 · primary source
  4. U.S. District Court S.D. Florida (CourtListener RECAP): Benavides v. Tesla, No. 21-cv-21940, ECF 616: Notice of Appeal · 16 March 2026 · primary source
  5. NHTSA Office of Defects Investigation: ODI Resume RQ24009 (recall query on recall 23V838) · 25 April 2024 · primary source
  6. NHTSA Office of Defects Investigation: ODI Resume EA26002 (upgrade from PE24031) · 18 March 2026 · primary source
  7. NHTSA Office of Defects Investigation: INOV-EA26002 (opening notice) · 18 March 2026 · primary source
  8. Claims Journal (Bloomberg): Tesla Faces Intensified US Safety Probe Over 'Full-Self Driving' · 19 March 2026 · secondary source
  9. NHTSA Office of Defects Investigation: ODI Resume PE25012 (FSD Traffic Safety Violations) · 7 October 2025 · primary source
  10. The Weekly Driver: Why NHTSA Is Investigating 2.88 Million Teslas Over Red Lights · 15 July 2026 · secondary source
  11. Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS): First partial driving automation safeguard ratings show industry has work to do · 12 March 2024 · primary source
  12. CBS News: Tesla robotaxis involved in 14 crashes since launching in Austin, Texas, in 2025 · 17 February 2026 · secondary source
  13. Electrek: Tesla unredacts robotaxi crash narratives at NHTSA · 15 May 2026 · secondary source
  14. Insurance Journal: Judge Upholds $243m Verdict Against Tesla Over Fatal Autopilot Crash · 23 February 2026 · secondary source
  15. Electrek: Tesla settles Autopilot fire truck death lawsuit · 2 September 2026 · secondary source
  16. Tesla, Inc. (SEC EDGAR): Form 10-K 2025, Cybersecurity Risk Management and Strategy Disclosure (R29) · 31 December 2025 · primary source
  17. Tesla, Inc.: Product Security · 3 November 2026 · primary source
  18. Tesla, Inc.: Customer Privacy Notice · 3 November 2026 · primary source
  19. SC World: Tesla hacked at Pwn2Own Automotive 2026 · January 2026 · secondary source
  20. Tesla, Inc. (SEC EDGAR): Form 10-K 2025, Commitments and Contingencies (R22) · 31 December 2025 · primary source
  21. Tesla, Inc.: Model S Owner's Manual: Full Self-Driving (Supervised) · 3 November 2026 · primary source
  22. NHTSA Office of Defects Investigation: ODI Resume AQ25002 (audit query on SGO reports) · 19 August 2025 · primary source
  23. MobileSyrup (via CBC News): Tesla's Grok AI asks for nudes · 29 October 2025 · secondary source

3 · Transparency

limitedWeight 20%

The California DMV found misleading advertising for driver assistance; the manual sets out limits in detail, but system or model information is missing.

What is documented
  • The manual describes limits at junctions, traffic lights, in bad weather and with cameras, as well as the driver's responsibility5
  • Tesla publishes the methodology of its safety statistics, including stated limitations9
  • After the DMV decision, Tesla adjusted its advertising; the DMV refrained from suspension1
  • The crash descriptions of the robotaxi service were disclosed in May 20264
The case against
Misleading communication
  • On 2025-12-16 the DMV found that Tesla advertised misleadingly and unlawfully with «Autopilot» and «Full Self-Driving Capability»; Tesla is challenging this in court6 7
  • Securities and consumer lawsuits accuse Tesla of false statements about the capabilities of its driving systems; they are pending8
Data hardly verifiable
  • According to a media analysis, Tesla redacts crash description, software version and operating domain in almost all Level 2 reports3
  • Researchers criticise the comparison basis of the safety statistics; raw data is not public11
  • System or safety reports on FSD and the robotaxi and information on training data are missing
Sources for Transparency (12)
  1. California Department of Motor Vehicles: Tesla Takes Corrective Action to Avoid DMV Suspension · 17 February 2026 · primary source
  2. Tesla Oracle: Grok AI comes to Tesla vehicles in Europe with the 2026.2.6 software update (official release notes) · 20 February 2026 · secondary source
  3. Electrek: Tesla Autopilot/FSD crashes: the hidden data · 1 September 2026 · secondary source
  4. Electrek: Tesla unredacts robotaxi crash narratives at NHTSA · 15 May 2026 · secondary source
  5. Tesla, Inc.: Model S Owner's Manual: Full Self-Driving (Supervised) · 3 November 2026 · primary source
  6. California Department of Motor Vehicles: DMV Finds Tesla Violated California State Law · 16 December 2025 · primary source
  7. Electrek: Tesla sues California DMV to reverse FSD false advertising ruling · 23 February 2026 · secondary source
  8. Tesla, Inc. (SEC EDGAR): Form 10-Q as of 2026-09-30, Note Commitments and Contingencies (R19) · 21 October 2026 · primary source
  9. Tesla, Inc.: Full Self-Driving (Supervised) Vehicle Safety Report (methodology) · 3 November 2026 · primary source
  10. RDW (Rijksdienst voor het Wegverkeer): Explanatory note on type approval FSD Supervised · 17 June 2026 · primary source
  11. Reuters (via Carrier Management): Tesla's own AI trainers don't trust its self-driving tech or its safety stats · 28 May 2026 · secondary source
  12. Tesla, Inc.: Customer Privacy Notice · 3 November 2026 · primary source

4 · Controversies (15)

Further controversies (9)

5 · What remains open

  • Outcome of the appeal in Benavides v. Tesla before the Eleventh Circuit
  • Outcome of NHTSA proceedings RQ24009, EA26002, PE25012 and AQ25002
  • Outcome of Tesla's lawsuit against the DMV decision and status of the DOJ and SEC inquiries
  • Internal AI policies referred to in the Audit Committee charter
  • Whether Tesla continues to redact crash descriptions; so far known only from a secondary analysis
  • The 2024 and 2025 impact reports as PDF and Items 1C and 3 in the main text of the 2025 10-K could not be read

6 · How it was assessed

Cut-off date: 3 November 2026 · 42 searches, 48 fetches.

Primary documents read (10)
  • Form 10-K 2025 (p. 13) with XBRL pages R22 and R29 (p. 16, p. 15)
  • Form 10-Q as of 2026-09-30, R19 and R21 (p. 11, p. 12)
  • Proxy Statement DEF 14A 2026 (p. 17)
  • Audit Committee Charter and Corporate Governance Guidelines 2025 (p. 32, p. 33)
  • Court records Benavides v. Tesla: Order Dkt. 612 and Notice of Appeal Dkt. 616 (p. 30, p. 29)
  • NHTSA Resumes EA26002, RQ24009, PE25012, AQ25002 (p. 05 to p. 09)
  • DMV press releases of 2025-12-16 and 2026-02-17 (S02, S01)
  • RDW explanation of type approval FSD (Supervised) (S21)
  • SEC statement on the 2025 shareholder proposal (S27)
  • Tesla Owner's Manual FSD (Supervised), Product Security, Privacy Notice, safety statistics methodology (S45, S41, S25, S23)

Research of 3 November 2026 under Globalance AI Footprint rulebook version 0

We assess documented practice in dealing with AI; this is not an investment recommendation. Three pillars, weights 40/40/20, harm rule.

Research of 3 November 2026 under Globalance AI Footprint rulebook version 0. Documented observations from public sources, no investment recommendation.

Important Notice. This material is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any financial instrument, nor does it constitute investment advice or a recommendation. The GI 100 Index is a rules-based strategy index of Globalance Bank. Investments involve risk, including the loss of capital invested. The final product documents (including FinSA) shall prevail in all cases.

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