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Capital Order · Pillar 12

The economy ahead is the greatest challenge to the central bank mandate since Bretton Woods.

All thirteen other pillars share one precondition: functioning monetary and capital markets. In the economy ahead, these markets will face a stress test the twentieth century never knew. When labour income shrinks structurally, consumer demand collapses unless the state or capital ownership compensates. That has radical implications for interest rates, asset prices, monetary policy, and the architecture of the global financial system. This is Globalance's core area of expertise.

Pillar 12KI
01 · Status quo & fault line

Where do things stand today, and where do they break?

Status quo

The world has been locked in a structural low-interest-rate regime since 2008, reinforced by expectations of automation-driven deflation. Asset inflation followed: the S&P 500 rose 500% since 2009, Swiss city property prices rose 120% since 2010, while real wages stagnated. The gap between returns on capital and returns on labour (the capital–labour split) is widening: the capital share of national income in OECD countries rose from 32% (1980) to 40% (2023). Central banks are responding to a structurally new situation with instruments designed for the post-war era. Global debt stands at 350% of GDP (IMF 2024), at a historic high.

Fault line

The economy ahead hits financial markets through four simultaneous shocks: 1. Demand collapse: When labour income falls and state compensation (UBI, Capital Dividend) does not scale, private consumer demand collapses. Asset prices anchored to corporate profits follow suit. 2. Debt-Deflation Spiral: Automation-driven deflation raises real debt burdens. Debtors (households, SMEs) come under pressure and insolvencies rise. 3. Central bank dilemma: Low interest rates stabilise asset prices, favour capital owners, and deepen inequality. Raising rates accelerates the debt crisis. No conventional instrument fits. 4. Currency fragmentation: Geopolitical tech blocs are driving currency regime shifts. BRICS countries are testing alternatives to the USD. Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) are fundamentally changing monetary transmission.

02 · Policy options

Paths out of the crisis

The stars show how realistic a path is: 1 star = barely feasible, 5 stars = highly feasible.

A★★★☆☆ 3/5

Mandate unchanged

Price stability remains the sole anchor of monetary policy.

+ Clarity and credibility: the most valuable asset a central bank holds, and the fastest to lose.

Does not address the demand question. Price stability alongside collapsing purchasing power is stable and poor.

Trade-off: Reliability weighed against ineffectiveness at the critical point.

Feasibility: The position most central banks hold today. It is internally consistent, as long as someone else solves the demand question.

B★★☆☆☆ 2/5

Extended mandate

Employment and distribution become a second monetary policy objective.

+ The institution with the largest toolkit addresses the largest problem.

The central bank is drawn into questions of distribution for which it has neither a mandate nor democratic legitimacy. The price is its independence.

Trade-off: Impact versus independence.

Feasibility: Historically, mixing monetary policy with distribution policy rarely ends well. The central bank loses its independence first, and then its effectiveness.

C★★★★☆ 4/5

Fiscal demand support

Transfers sustain purchasing power, financed through capital income and externality levies.

+ Addresses the problem directly: without demand there is no revenue, without revenue there is no valuation.

Shifts the burden to public finances, and thereby to the unresolved question from Pillar 01.

Trade-off: Demand today versus fiscal pressure tomorrow.

Feasibility: Only works in conjunction with the tax reform. In isolation, it is deficit spending by another name.

D★★★★☆ 4/5

participation model

Capital income replaces part of wage income, through a sovereign fund with distributions.

+ Resolves demand and distribution with a single instrument, giving the population co-ownership of the value generated to replace wages.

Requires an early entry. Buying after the valuation expansion means buying dear. The fund then carries the market risk for everyone.

Trade-off: Participation versus market timing.

Feasibility: The only model that does not require the distributional question to be renegotiated politically every year.

E★★★☆☆ 3/5

Central bank digital currency as infrastructure

Direct payment channels for transfers, independent of the banking system.

+ Makes transfers fast, cheap, and seamless, including for people without a banking relationship.

It solves the disbursement question, not the financing question. It also raises serious questions about payment data privacy that entail a significant political cost.

Trade-off: Efficiency versus trust.

Feasibility: A useful tool, not a model. It answers the question of 'how', not the question of 'where the money comes from'.

03 · Time horizon

Trigger-based phases

Phase 1
Valuation expansion

Trigger: Productivity gains accrue to capital owners before they reach the broader population

Margins rise, employment stagnates, valuations run ahead of underlying value creation. For investors, this is at once the most comfortable and the most dangerous phase.

Phase 2
Demand shortfall

Trigger: The decline in the aggregate wage bill reaches consumption

Revenue no longer follows margins. Those selling to end consumers feel it first; those selling to businesses feel it later. Valuations correct not through interest rates, but through revenues.

Phase 3
New distribution architecture

Trigger: Capital income accounts for a meaningful share of household incomes

Participation models and transfers stabilise demand. The valuation level normalises on a broader base, with the state holding a structurally larger share of the capital structure.

04 · Pilot Programmes

Real-world pilot programmes

Where the ideas behind this pillar are already being tested. "Learn more" opens the explanation without leaving the page.

Alaska Permanent Fund ↗Status: active, fund since 1976, dividend since 1982 · 2026: $1,200 per personResource revenues flow into a fund, from whose returns the state pays an annual dividend to eligible residents (over 600,000 people in 2025); parliament sets the amount in the budget. This participation model has run for decades, though the level is politically contested and fluctuates.
Government Pension Fund Global (Norway) ↗Status: active, established 1990, first contribution 1996 · value 30.6.2026: NOK 22,683bnCapital stock as a second source of state revenue (today the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world).
compenswiss (AHV equalisation fund) ↗Status: OngoingA capital-stock component within a pay-as-you-go system: the Swiss starting point for a participation model.
Digital Euro ↗Status: next phase since 30.10.2025 · regulation not yet adoptedCentral bank money for everyday use: the infrastructure question that must be answered before the distribution question. The ECB is building the technology; the EU still needs to adopt the legal basis. The European Parliament set its negotiating mandate in July 2026; talks with the Council are pending. A pilot is possible at the earliest from mid-2027, and only if the legislation is adopted in 2026; first issuance at the earliest in 2029.
05 · Early Indicators

What we are watching

Share of profits earned by the seven largest US technology companies
Today
approximately one third
Threshold
above 35 per cent and rising

The higher the share, the more the entire market's valuation level depends on a few balance sheets, and the more directly a demand dip affects everyone.

Track in the index →
Yield on ten-year US Treasury bonds
Today
materially above the average of the past decade
Threshold
persistently above 5 per cent

The large investment programmes were costed on cheap money. A persistently higher rate will determine which of them actually get built.

Track in the index →
Uninsured US bank deposits
Today
almost half
Threshold
above 60 per cent

In a confidence crisis, such funds move first, today via smartphone within hours. The higher the share, the shorter the system's reaction time.

Track in the index →
06 · Globalance Position

Our assessment

At Globalance, we regard demand as the pivotal factor, not monetary policy. Asset prices are calibrated on the assumption that wage income sustains consumption. If that prop disappears without a replacement, valuations correct — not through interest rates, but through revenues.

What is sustainable is the combination of fiscal demand support and participation model. One maintains purchasing power through the transition; the other makes it permanent. Whoever holds stakes in the value creation that replaces wages needs no annually renegotiated transfer. Together, both are financeable; neither is on its own.

We would caution against an expanded central bank mandate . The idea is tempting because central banks can act quickly and without seeking permission. That is precisely the objection: distribution without democratic legitimacy does not survive two business cycles, and what is lost in the process is the independence needed for the central bank's core task.

For investors has one uncomfortable consequence. Whoever holds capital stakes stands on the right side of the shift, but only for as long as customers still exist. The question of who can hold stakes is therefore not purely a social one: demand without broad participation is an earnings risk, and it does not feature in any valuation model.

What this means for investors: First, pension capital flowing into productive assets today buys in at lower valuations than capital that arrives only once scarcity sets in. Timing matters. Second, distributions to the broader population could become politically urgent if labour income weakens as the engine of demand. That would have consequences for the taxation of capital returns. Third, the question 'Who buys the product in 2035, and what does that customer live on?' belongs in every company assessment. Fourth, valuation levels and employment trends should be read side by side: when profits rise as the wage bill falls, the risk of a correction grows.

Why now: A participation model is an entry decision. Whoever enters after the valuation expansion pays a multiple for the same stake and carries the market risk at the worst possible moment. That is why this Pillar is not a question for the next decade, but for this legislative term.

The case against

The strongest objection is the empirical record of recent decades. The wage share of value added has been falling since the 1980s, yet consumer demand did not collapse. It was sustained through debt, rising labour-force participation, and global markets. It is possible that the same buffers will work again and that a collapse in demand simply will not occur. The second objection: if productivity rises strongly enough, prices fall and real purchasing power grows without higher wages. Anyone who rules that out must explain why this time should be different.

07 · Open Questions

What we do not yet know

  1. What sustains consumer demand when wage income is structurally shrinking?
  2. How does one value a company whose margins are rising while its end market is contracting?
  3. Who should be able to hold capital stakes, and how does someone without assets come to hold them?
  4. Does an independent central bank retain its legitimacy when monetary policy visibly distributes wealth?

What comes next