Skip to content
GLOBALANCE INTELLIGENCEThe economy ahead.
This Week Index 28/100 Sign in
Countries › USA
SwitzerlandGermanyChinaUSA
← All 14 pillars of the USACountries › USA › Pillar 11 of 14
PILLAR 11 · SYSTEMS COMPETITION · USA

Geopolitics & Locational Competitiveness

US status: On trackUS module · Systemic competition

Leadership in AI, compute, and semiconductor design; sovereignty over key technologies largely secured.

01 · STATUS QUO & FAULT LINE

Where does the USA stand, and where does it break?

STATUS QUO

Through companies such as Nvidia, the major cloud providers and the leading AI laboratories, the United States commands a degree of sovereignty over AI hardware and frontier models that other nations are striving to match (Stanford AI Index). With the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, the federal government committed approximately $52.7bn for semiconductor manufacturing and research to bring production back onshore. The US dominates chip design, electronic design automation software and foundation models. The manufacture of leading-edge chips takes place overwhelmingly in Taiwan at TSMC. This strategic dependence could, in the event of conflict, affect the entire AI value chain. In response, TSMC is building several facilities in Arizona with up to $6.6bn in CHIPS Act funding, with initial production already under way. At the same time, the United States is deploying export controls on leading-edge chips as a deliberate geopolitical instrument to restrict China's access to AI computing power (BIS). The competition with China for AI leadership has elevated compute, chips and talent to the status of national priorities. The US leads in frontier models and commercialisation, while China is closing the gap in patent volumes and manufacturing scale.

FAULT LINE

In the economy ahead, control over compute, chips and foundation models is tantamount to control over the new value creation. The US is heavily dependent on Taiwan for the most advanced chip manufacturing. A conflict in the Taiwan Strait would immediately jeopardise the supply of cutting-edge chips and, with it, AI leadership. Technological strength rests on a supply chain that is both geographically concentrated and geopolitically exposed. Domestic political vulnerability compounds this. Deep polarisation, shifting foreign and trade policy, and a federalism that allows states to drift apart all reduce the predictability on which allies and investors depend. Export controls are an effective instrument, but they provoke countermeasures and accelerate China's drive to develop its own chip capacity. Whether the US can secure its lead depends on how quickly it reshores manufacturing or shifts it to reliable partners, and on how consistent its policy remains.

02 · POLICY OPTIONS

Paths for the USA

A
Reshoring manufacturing (via the CHIPS Act)★★★☆☆ 3/5

Via the CHIPS Act and subsequent programmes, the US is reshoring the manufacture of advanced chips and shifting production to trusted partners, with the aim of reducing dependence on Taiwan. This strikes at the heart of the fault line, since fabrication is the most vulnerable point in the value chain. TSMC Arizona, Intel and Samsung are already building capacity. The price is steep: fabrication plants cost tens of billions of dollars, take years to complete and require specialist workers — and the most advanced manufacturing remains concentrated in Taiwan for the time being.

+ Reduces critical dependence on Taiwan
– Extremely capital-, time- and skills-intensive

Trade-off: security of supply versus cost and construction pace

Feasibility: Results will only become apparent over a full decade

B
Export controls and technology alliances★★★☆☆ 3/5

The US maintains its lead through export controls on advanced chips and manufacturing equipment, coordinating these with allies including the Netherlands, Japan, and Taiwan. This is significant because it delays China's access to frontier compute and anchors Western standards. The downside: controls provoke countermeasures, drive China towards indigenous development, and weigh on the revenues of US chipmakers. Their effectiveness depends entirely on alliance cohesion.

+ Effectively delays the rise of competitors
– Invites countermeasures and China's indigenous development

Trade-off: technological lead versus trade and revenue risks

Feasibility: Only enforceable with a united alliance

C
Attracting talent and securing research leadership★★★☆☆ 3/5

The United States is securing its leadership by attracting the world's foremost AI talent through immigration and elite universities, while expanding public research investment. This matters because top-tier human expertise is the scarcest resource in the AI economy, and the United States has traditionally led in this regard. The capital-talent cycle of Silicon Valley represents a distinctive competitive advantage. The risk lies in restrictive immigration policy, which could impede the inflow of talent, and in brain drain should other countries become more attractive.

+ Secures the scarcest resource: top talent
– Contingent on an open immigration policy

Trade-off: innovation leadership versus the immigration policy debate

Feasibility: Restrictive immigration would undermine this advantage

D
Strengthening political predictability vis-à-vis partners★★☆☆☆ 2/5

The United States is improving the reliability of its foreign, trade and technology policy in order to bind allies and investors more closely. This addresses the domestic political vulnerability that, alongside dependence on Taiwan, represents the most significant weakness. Predictable alliances and trade rules reduce costs for all parties involved. The structural constraint lies in deep polarisation and federalism, both of which make consistent, cross-party, long-term commitments inherently difficult.

+ Binds allies and investors over the long term
– Polarisation makes reliable commitments difficult

Trade-off: alliance stability versus domestic political reality

Feasibility: Difficult to steer, as it hinges on domestic politics

03 · TIME HORIZON

Trigger-based phases

Phase 1: Compute as a factor of power

Trigger: The AI competition with China makes compute, chips, and talent a national priority; export controls become an instrument of policy.

The United States is consolidating its lead through models, computing power and supply-chain control. At the same time, dependence on Taiwanese fabrication is recognised as a strategic risk, and the build-out of reshoring begins.

Phase 2: Supply-chain restructuring

Trigger: New fabs in Arizona and at partner locations come on stream, whilst export controls and countermeasures reshape global supply chains.

Manufacturing diversifies gradually, but remains costly and slow. The cohesion of the technology alliance and the political predictability of the United States will determine how stable the new order proves to be.

Phase 3: Leadership consolidated or at risk

Trigger: It becomes clear whether the US has reduced its manufacturing dependency and secured its leadership, or whether geopolitical shocks have left it exposed.

If reshoring and alliance management succeed, the US will remain the centre of global compute. If dependency on Taiwan stays high and policy remains unpredictable, that leadership will remain vulnerable. The course set during these years will shape the country's position through to 2040.

04 · PILOT PROGRAMMES

Real-world pilot programmes

CHIPS and Science Act (2022)

Status: Under implementation (approximately $52.7bn for semiconductor manufacturing and research)

The CHIPS Act is the central US industrial programme to bring chip manufacturing back to the United States and reduce dependence on Asia. It is the test case for whether state industrial policy can durably secure the most vulnerable point in the AI value chain — fabrication.

Open project

TSMC Arizona: fabs in Phoenix

Status: Under implementation (initial production under way, further facilities planned)

TSMC is building several plants in Arizona with up to $6.6bn in CHIPS Act funding, manufacturing cutting-edge chips at scale in the United States for the first time. The project is the concrete test of whether dependence on Taiwan can be meaningfully reduced.

Open project

BIS Export Controls on AI Chips

Status: In force (continuously updated restrictions on advanced compute exports to China)

The Bureau of Industry and Security restricts the export of state-of-the-art AI chips and manufacturing equipment. As a geopolitical instrument, it illustrates how the US seeks to protect its compute lead — whilst also revealing the limits of such controls and the countermeasures they provoke.

Open project

05 · EARLY INDICATORS

What we are watching

Share of cutting-edge chip manufacturing outside Taiwan

This measures the degree to which critical manufacturing remains geographically concentrated. The indicator matters because sustained concentration perpetuates the geopolitical vulnerability of the AI value chain. If it does not shift, leadership remains exposed. For strategic security, diversification is what counts.

Today: Advanced manufacturing overwhelmingly concentrated in Taiwan (SIA)
→
Threshold: No meaningful diversification despite CHIPS investments
US leadership in frontier models and compute

This lead measures whether the US holds a commanding position at the source of AI value creation. The threshold matters because any loss of leadership in models and compute undermines the country's broader competitive advantage. Should competitors close the gap, the balance of power shifts. For positioning through to 2040, this indicator is central.

Today: Leadership in foundation models and available computing power (Stanford AI Index)
→
Threshold: Competing nations closing the gap in frontier models
Cohesion of the technology alliance

This measures how united the Western alliance is in applying export controls. The indicator matters because the effectiveness of those controls depends entirely on that unity. If the alliance frays, the controls lose their force. For geopolitical strategy, partner cohesion is what counts.

Today: Export controls coordinated with the Netherlands, Japan, and Taiwan (BIS)
→
Threshold: Erosion of coordination or unilateral action by individual partners
06 · OPEN QUESTIONS

What we do not yet know

1. How quickly can manufacturing dependency on Taiwan be meaningfully reduced?
2. Do export controls protect the lead, or do they accelerate China's indigenous development?
3. Does domestic political polarisation undermine the predictability on which allies depend?
← All pillars: overviewNext: 12 · Money, Capital & Financial Markets →

What comes next