Geopolitics & Locational Competitiveness
High dependence on exports, gaps in chips and raw materials, and geopolitical vulnerability.
Where does Germany stand, and where does it break?
Germany depends on foreign trade to a degree that few other G7 economies match. Its export ratio stands at around 43 per cent of gross domestic product. In 2025, China once again became the largest trading partner, with a trade volume of €251.8bn, overtaking the United States (€240.5bn). Imports from China rose to €170.6bn, while German exports to China fell by 9.7 per cent. The United States remained the most important export destination at €146.2bn, yet exports there declined by 9.4 per cent in 2025 under the impact of new US tariffs. Germany is thus simultaneously dependent on China as a sourcing market and on the United States as a sales market, without holding a balance of power with either.
The "Zeitenwende" and de-risking vis-à-vis China are colliding with a semiconductor and AI infrastructure that Germany does not itself control: Intel has halted the large-scale project in Magdeburg that had attracted more than €10bn in public subsidies. The TSMC joint venture ESMC in Dresden manufactures only chips on mature nodes, and the advanced processors required for AI continue to come from Taiwan and the United States. If AI shifts value creation from the factory floor into data centres and model providers, Germany's classic export product — the refined, engineering-intensive machine — loses relative weight against the computing power and data dominance concentrated in California and Shenzhen. The economy ahead risks devaluing Germany's industrial strengths for as long as the country remains structurally dependent on computing power, cloud services, and leading-edge semiconductors.
Paths for Germany
Germany is binding itself technologically close to the United States, sourcing AI models, cloud services, and advanced chips from the US ecosystem and aligning with Washington's decoupling course towards China. For the export-intensive industrial sector, this secures short-term access to the most capable AI systems and to the US market. The price is a deep dependence on a partner that in 2025 used tariffs to push German exports down by 9.4 per cent and whose reliability is subject to political fluctuation. For a nation whose largest trading partner is China, a forced decoupling also means the loss of its most important sourcing and growth market.
Trade-off: technological capability today against strategic autonomy tomorrow
Feasibility: Simply replaces dependence on China with dependence on the United States
As the core of a European coalition, Germany is investing in its own data centres, AI models and semiconductor manufacturing — through instruments such as the EU Chips Act and projects such as ESMC Dresden. For an export nation without its own platform champions, this is the only way to avoid becoming a pure technology taker in the economy ahead. The approach is costly and slow, and is hampered by EU fragmentation, but it is the only one that promises a durably independent position between the blocs. It aligns with Germany's strengths in industry, engineering and the Mittelstand, provided those strengths are coupled with data power.
Trade-off: Near-term disadvantage versus long-term independence
Feasibility: Requires German leadership and funding, not merely rhetoric
Germany deliberately keeps its distance from both blocs, diversifying supply chains and sales markets across India, South-East Asia and Latin America while avoiding firm commitments. For an economy that is extremely dependent on exports, this reduces concentration risk vis-à-vis China and the United States. At the same time, the country risks obtaining only second-tier access in both technology spheres and being left behind in frontier AI research. The strategy buys flexibility, but delivers no technological base of its own.
Trade-off: Risk diversification versus technological depth
Feasibility: Viable only in combination with European sovereignty-building
Germany continues its existing foreign-trade model and hopes that free trade and industrial excellence will resolve its competitive positioning challenges on their own. In the face of US tariffs, Chinese competition in cars and machinery, and the AI-driven shift in value creation, this is the riskiest option. Indecision perpetuates dual dependency and cedes technological sovereignty to the United States and China. For a nation whose business model is eroding, waiting is the most expensive choice.
Trade-off: Convenience today versus loss of control tomorrow
Feasibility: In effect, the decision not to act
Trigger-based phases
Trigger: A new round of US tariffs or Chinese export controls on critical raw materials deals a material blow to a key German industry sector.
Companies and policymakers respond defensively: supply chains are duplicated, stockpiles of rare earths and intermediate inputs are built up, and initial reshoring options are assessed. The federal government consolidates the fragmented funding landscape for data centres and chip manufacturing. The focus is on damage limitation rather than capacity-building.
Trigger: ESMC Dresden reaches serial production and a European AI computing infrastructure begins to take shape.
Germany is shifting capital away from subsidising legacy industries towards computing power, energy and semiconductor ecosystems. European coordination will determine whether individual projects coalesce into a viable foundation. The first domestic AI value chains are emerging at the intersection of industry and software.
Trigger: The share of AI-adjacent value creation in GDP surpasses that of conventional vehicle exports.
Germany has either established itself as a sovereign European technology core or has become a technology taker caught between the blocs. The foreign-trade model has been rebuilt from the ground up — away from pure goods exports and towards technology- and data-enhanced services. The country's geopolitical negotiating position depends directly on the success of Phase 2.
Real-world pilot programmes
Status: Under construction; production start planned for around 2027
The European Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, a joint venture, is intended to manufacture chips for the automotive and industrial sectors, with a total investment of around €10bn and approximately €5bn in public subsidies. It is Germany's most important real-world project for attracting semiconductor production. However, it covers only mid-range process nodes, not leading-edge AI processors.
Status: Under development; funding from the BMWK and federal states consolidated
The federal government and data centre operators are establishing sovereign AI computing capacity, thereby reducing dependence on US hyperscalers. This initiative is a key factor in determining whether German companies can run their data and models on European infrastructure. The gap relative to US cloud providers remains considerable.
Status: Successfully scaled; state-backed AI champion. To be examined as a model for Germany
France has built a European AI model provider in Mistral AI, supported by targeted industrial policy and positioned as a sovereign alternative to US systems. The approach demonstrates how state backing, talent and capital can create a champion. Germany has yet to produce a comparable national model provider of this scale.
Status: Global market leader; deep ecosystem integration. To be examined as a model for Germany
Taiwan combines cutting-edge manufacturing, suppliers, research and talent in a tightly integrated cluster that dominates the global chip supply. It demonstrates that semiconductor sovereignty requires an entire ecosystem and decades of commitment, not a single factory. For Saxony's Silicon Saxony, it serves as both a benchmark and a warning.
What we are watching
A sustained slump would signal that Chinese competitors are displacing German industrial products in China's home market. For this export nation, that would mean losing its most important growth market of the past two decades. Pressure to rebuild the business model from the ground up would intensify. At the same time, political dependency would tilt further towards the United States.
As long as no leading-edge processors are produced domestically, the country's AI infrastructure remains wholly reliant on external sources. Such a milestone would demonstrate that Europe is catching up in the strategically decisive area of advanced manufacturing capacity. Its absence would cement Germany's role as a technology recipient. This metric is the most rigorous test of the sovereignty strategy.
Rising US tariffs are eroding the value of Germany's most important export market. They compel either diversification or the relocation of production to the United States. The automotive and mechanical engineering sectors are particularly exposed. Crossing the threshold would undermine transatlantic alignment as a strategy. It would either accelerate the build-up of sovereignty or hasten a loss of relevance.
When frontier research relocates, value creation follows. For a country whose prosperity rests on engineering expertise, this represents a gradual erosion of substance. This indicator reveals earlier than trade balances whether the location remains competitive. It measures attractiveness for talent and capital alike.