Individual: Purpose & Identity
A deeply ingrained work ethic (996) meets the tang-ping movement. The question of meaning in work is being renegotiated.
Where does China stand, and where might it break?
The 996 work culture — working from 9am to 9pm, six days a week — shaped China's technology sector for years. The Supreme People's Court explicitly ruled it unlawful in 2021. As a counter-movement, "tang ping", or lying flat, emerged from 2021 onwards: a deliberate withdrawal from the race for status, career advancement and consumption, accompanied by related currents such as "bai lan" (let it rot) and the term "nei juan" (involution), describing a competitive struggle perceived as pointless. The underlying numbers are stark. Urban youth unemployment among 16- to 24-year-olds reached a record of approximately 21.3% in June 2023 (NBS China), whereupon the statistics authority suspended publication and revised its methodology. Under the new measure, which excludes students, the rate fluctuated between roughly 13% and just under 19% in 2024, peaking at 18.8% in August 2024. High housing costs in major cities, intense competition in education, and diminishing prospects for upward mobility are deepening the disillusionment. At the same time, marriage and birth rates have fallen sharply, further accelerating demographic ageing. Surveys such as the Edelman Trust Barometer record high levels of trust in state institutions in China, yet the individual search for meaning is increasingly taking place outside the official narrative of merit and reward.
AI is automating precisely the office and knowledge work that was meant to offer millions of university graduates a pathway into the middle class. If that channel of upward mobility narrows while housing and education costs remain high, the social promise that diligence leads to advancement loses its credibility. The question of meaning shifts: when neither hard work nor education reliably secures prosperity, work becomes a fragile source of identity and status, and withdrawing into lying flat becomes the rational choice. For the state, this is a sensitive matter, as its claim to legitimacy rests on the promise of rising prosperity and upward social mobility. Whether China opens up new sources of purpose, contribution and participation for younger generations — or whether resignation and withdrawal become entrenched — will shape social cohesion through to 2040.
Paths for China
China is upgrading the status of care, community, and cultural work, creating recognised — and in some cases remunerated — forms of contribution beyond conventional employment. This matters because an ageing population is generating enormous demand for care, while AI is narrowing the scope of paid work. Rural revitalisation programmes and voluntary service initiatives point in this direction. The trade-off is that such activities must be genuinely valued — socially and financially — to be experienced as meaningful, and that state direction risks undermining the voluntary character of participation.
Trade-off: sense of purpose versus the income and status value of work
Feasibility: Only effective if the new fields are genuinely recognised and remunerated
The state consistently upholds the prohibition on 996 culture, confirmed by the Supreme Court in 2021. It caps overtime and eases pressure from education and housing costs. This addresses the core of the fault line, as overwork and high living costs fuel the lying-flat response. The regulation of private tutoring, begun in 2021, demonstrates that the state is capable of tackling performance pressure. The cost lies in the tension with productivity — and in the fact that regulations are frequently circumvented in practice for as long as competitive pressure persists.
Trade-off: quality of life versus the intensity of economic output
Feasibility: Enforcement determines outcomes — not the law on paper
China is aligning education and retraining towards complementary, AI-adjacent skills, so that university degrees and continuing education reliably lead once again to employment and advancement. This is appealing because the decoupling of education from advancement is fuelling the crisis of meaning — visible in high youth unemployment despite record numbers of graduates. The cost: retraining alone creates no jobs when AI is structurally reducing demand for knowledge work. And competitive pressure merely shifts.
Trade-off: upskilling against the limits of labour demand
Feasibility: Only effective if new employment fields emerge in parallel
Trigger-based phases
Trigger: Youth unemployment remains high, while lying flat and involution shape public discourse as defining concepts.
Growing numbers of young people are withdrawing from the race for status and consumption. Marriage and birth rates are falling. The state responds with the promise of common prosperity.
Trigger: AI automates entry-level and knowledge work, and the traditional route from education to the middle class narrows visibly.
The promise of meritocracy is coming under strain. The state is easing performance pressure and living costs, opening new avenues for contribution in care and community, and re-orienting education towards AI-complementary skills.
Trigger: Meaning and identity partially decouple from conventional paid employment, and new forms of contribution gain recognition.
China is forging a new balance between the performance ethic and quality of life. Whether this supports social cohesion or whether resignation prevails will determine social stability through to 2040.
Real-world pilot programmes
Status: In force (policy decision against excessive overtime)
In 2021, the Supreme People's Court and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security declared the 996 practice unlawful and published model cases. The ruling is a test case: can the performance pressure of the technology sector be curbed through law when competitive pressure persists?
Status: In force ("Double Reduction" policy)
The "Double Reduction" reform introduced in 2021 drastically restricted commercial tutoring in order to reduce educational competition and the cost burden on families. It demonstrates that the state is directly addressing performance and cost pressures — with mixed side effects for employment and the market. The regulation is in force, yet the tutoring sector continues to operate.
Status: Under implementation (national initiatives)
Through the "Rural Revitalisation" strategy and youth employment programmes, the state is directing young people towards regions and sectors with genuine need. These represent an attempt to create new fields of contribution and meaning beyond the saturated urban knowledge-work market.
What we are watching
This measures whether young people are able to access paid employment. The threshold matters because persistently high youth unemployment devalues the promise that effort will be rewarded and feeds the lying-flat phenomenon. Should it remain high, the decoupling of education from advancement will become entrenched. This is an early indicator of weakening social cohesion.
This indicator reflects confidence in the future and people's willingness to plan their lives. The threshold matters because falling marriage and birth rates both accelerate ageing and signal a deeper disillusionment with prospects for advancement and security. Should the trend fail to reverse, demographic and social pressures will reinforce one another.
This measures attitudes towards work as a source of meaning and status. The threshold matters because a widespread rejection of the performance ethos touches both productivity and the state's promise of legitimacy. Should the withdrawal become entrenched, society's relationship to work and contribution will change fundamentally.